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RETHINKING REFORM OF ELECTRICITY MARKETS
Sidney A. Shapiro*
Joseph P. Tomain**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The reform of regulation of electricity markets has the potential
to cause substantial changes in the way in which consumers receive
and use electricity. Reform-minded actors, particularly the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), have used their
regulatory powers to restructure electricity markets to rely on
competition in generation markets to promote lower prices and
innovation.
Other jurisdictions have been deterred by the
significant legal, policy, and political issues associated with reform
efforts.
California's horrendous experience with electricity
deregulationl and the calamitous electricity blackout in the
northeastern United States2 have added to the political, if not policy,
challenges of achieving reform. The editors of the Wake Forest Law
Review have dedicated this issue to understanding how these recent
experiences have affected efforts to reform the regulation of
electricity markets.
Reform efforts reflect a growing rejection of the "Traditional
Model" of electric utility regulation, and we agree that this model
has reached the end of its useful life. Such being the case, then,
what should replace it? Going where angels fear to tread, but fools
do not, we argue that the United States should pursue a "Smart
Model" of electricity generation that addresses a primary limitation
of current efforts to restructure electricity markets. While current
efforts seek to establish a competitive generation market, these
efforts do little or nothing to address the significant environmental
problems that are associated with the generation of electricity and

* University Distinguished Chair in Law, Wake Forest University School
of Law; Scholar, Center for Progressive Regulation.
** Dean Emeritus and Wilbert and Helen Ziegler Professor of Law,
University of Cincinnati College of Law. Scholar, Center for Progressive
Regulation. The authors appreciate the research assistance of Chad King and
Ilya Temchenko.
1. See Steven Ferrey, The Eagles of Deregulation: The Role of the Courts in
a Restructured Environment, 32 ENVTL. L. 297, 299-306 (2002).
2. See Antonio Regalado & Gary Fields, Blackout a Reminder of Grid's
Vulnerability to Terror, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2003, at A4.
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that will remain in restructured electricity markets.
In our view, the Smart Model has two components that fill this
gap.3 On the generation side, there would be increasing reliance on
renewable energy sources and on making the electrical grid more
efficient and more reliable. On the consumption side, the price of
electricity to each consumer would be based on the marginal cost of
producing it.
Our analysis proceeds in four stages. Part II describes the
negative impacts on the environment associated with the generation
of electricity and the production of energy used to generate
electricity. While progress has been made reducing these impacts,
they are still significant and require additional attention.
Part III describes the birth, life, and death of the "Traditional
Model." For the last three or more decades, federal and state
regulators have been engaged in widespread deregulation of
significant parts of the Traditional Mode1. 4 While we recognize the
significant advantages of this effort, it does not address reducing the
pollution and other environmental problems caused by relying on
fossil fuels, particularly coal, to generate electricity. Our analysis of
the disintegration of the Traditional Model reveals that we now
have an opportunity to remake electricity markets along the lines
suggested by the "Smart Model," but this agenda has not received
the attention it deserves from regulators, politicians, and the public.
Part IV describes a Smart Model of electricity generation
composed of four elements. A Smart Model would rely on both
distributed generation, which is composed of small-scale sources of
electricity generation that are environmentally friendly, and solarand wind-generated electricity because they are renewable sources
of energy. A Smart Model would also utilize energy portfolios or
regulatory standards that require electricity generators and sellers
to obtain a certain percentage of their electricity from renewable
sources. Finally, a Smart Model would employ a "Smart Grid" or a

3. See Elizabeth Thomas et aI., Unlocking Regulatory Barriers to
Sustainable Energy Systems, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 2004, at 51, 51
(recognizing the two components ofthe Smart Model).
4. Paul L. Joskow, Deregulation and Regulatory Reform in the U.S.
Electric Power Sector, in DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: WHAT'S NEXT
113 (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000); Richard D. Cudahy,
Electricity Deregulation After California: Down But Not Out, 54 ADMIN. L. REV.
333, 336-37 (2002); Alfred E. Kahn, The Deregulatory Tar Baby: The Precarious
Balance Between Regulation and Deregulation, 1970-2000 and Henceforward, J.
REG. ECON., Jan. 2002, at 35, 53 (2002); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W.
Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1323, 1324 (1998); John S. Moot, Economic Theories of Regulation and
Electricity Restructuring, 25 ENERGY L. J. 273, 274-78 (2004).
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system of distribution that relies on new technologies that make the
electricity grid more reliable and efficient.
Unfortunately, however, many elements of the Smart Model of
electricity generation are not ready for prime time because they are
not cost-effective as compared to traditional methods of electricity
generation and distribution. Although the government should
sponsor and is sponsoring projects that are intended to spur the
development of the Smart Model, we do not anticipate the
widespread adoption of the model until there is a more substantial
market demand for it.
We propose in Part V that a Smart Model of electricity
consumption is a more viable reform. The price of electricity in this
model is based on the marginal cost of producing and delivering
electricity. By comparison, consumers currently pay for electricity
based on its average cost. We recommend regulators require
utilities to install electrical meters that measure the time of day
during which electricity is consumed because this step would permit
the price of electricity to be based on the cost of generating and
distributing it. Once some form of marginal cost pricing is used,
consumers would have an incentive to conserve electricity during
periods of high demand, such as the hottest hours of the hottest
days in the middle of the summer in warm states.
Although we are hardly the first to recognize the merits of this
step, 5 this recommendation has not received the attention it
deserves, perhaps in part because of the daunting task of installing
electrical meters that permit marginal cost pricing in millions of
American homes and businesses. This is unfortunate in light of the
potential of marginal cost pricing to protect the environment.
Moreover, once electricity is priced on the actual cost of producing
and delivering it, there should be additional market demand for
smart methods of electricity generation and delivery. Finally, but
hardly least of all, some basic calculations strongly suggest that the
installation of new meters is cost-effective and may be far less costly
than efforts to add new generation and transmission capacity to
electrical markets if demand continues to grow at current rates.

II. ELECTRICITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The generation of electricity is one of the leading causes of
environmental problems in this country.
According to
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") data, electric utilities are
5. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How Will the California Debacle Affect
Energy Deregulation?, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 389, 407 (2002); Severin Borenstein et
al., An Open Letter from 11 Energy Experts: The Time Has Come for Real-Time
Pricing, PuB. UTIL. FORT., July 1, 2003, at 28, 28-29.
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the biggest polluters in the United States, with emissions far
exceeding those of other industries such as chemical manufacturing
and refining. 6
Many of the threats to the environment are from the release of
sulfur dioxide ("S02") and nitrogen oxides ("NOx") into the
atmosphere when electrical energy is generated. 7
Electricity
generated using coal produces most of the total S02 emissions in the
8
United States and a large percentage of the total NOx emissions.
These emissions create a number of environmental and health
problems, including the following:
• Emission of S02 and NOx gases can form fine particles, or
soot, when they react with the atmosphere, and coal-fired
9
power plants also emit soot directly from their smokestacks.
According to one estimate, this form of pollution may be
associated with as many as 64,000 premature deaths from
·
Imonary causes. 10
card lOpu
•
NOx emissions react with volatile organic compounds
(''VOCs'') and sunlight to form ground level ozone or smog. ll
"Millions of Americans live in areas that do not meet the
health standards for ozone.,,12 Recent scientific research with
laboratory animals, clinical subjects, and human populations
has identified "a cascade of adverse health effects from ozone
at levels common in the United States," including increased
respiratory symptoms, damage to cells of the respiratory

6. CLEAR THE AIR: THE NAT'L CAMPAIGN AGAINST DIRTY POWER, TOXIC
POWER: WHAT THE TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY TELLS Us ABOUT POWER PLANT
POLLUTION 1 (2000) [hereinafter CLEAR THE AIR, TOXIC POWER], available at
http://www.cleartheair.org/trilcomplete_report.pdf.
7. EPA, Acid Rain: What Society Can Do About Acid Deposition, at
http://www.epa.gov/airmarketsJacidrainlsociety/index.html (last updated Jan. 6,
2004). Sulfur, which is present in coal as an impurity, reacts with air when the
coal is burned to form SO.. By comparison, the burning of any fossil fuel forms

NOx.Id.
S. Id.
9. CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, No ESCAPE: CAN You REALLY EVER "GET AWAY"
FROM THE SMOG? A MIDSUMMER LOOK AT OZONE SMOG IN 1999 (1999), available
at http://www.catf.usJpublicationsJreports/No_Escape.pdf.
10. DEBORAH SHElMAN SHPRENTZ, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, BREATHTAKING: PREMATURE MORTALITY DUE TO PARTICULATE AIR POLLUTION IN 239
AMERICAN CITIES (1996), excerpted at http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution/
btlbtinx. asp.
11. EPA, Six Common Air Pollutants: Chief Causes for Concern, at
http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/nox/chf.html (last updated Jan. 6, 2005).
12. EPA, Six Common Air Pollutants: Health and Environmental Impacts
of NOx, at http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/noxlhlth.html (last updated Jan. 6,
2005) [hereinafter EPA, Impacts of NOxl.
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tract, pulmonary inflammation, declines in lung function,
increased susceptibility to respiratory infections, and
increased risk of hospitalization and early death. 13
• Acid rain is formed when S02 and NOx react with water and
14
oxygen in the atmosphere.
Acid rain results in the
deterioration of cars, buildings, and historical monuments
and causes lakes and streams to become acidic and
unsuitable for many fish. 15
Finally, but hardly least of all, one element of NOx, nitrous
oxide, is a greenhouse gas, which accumulates in the atmosphere
with other greenhouse gases, causing global warming. 16 According
to the Sierra Club, the United States emits twenty-five percent of
the world's greenhouse gasses, and power plants are responsible for
forty percent of these emissions. 17
Besides these emissions, power plants also produce large
amounts of toxic metals. IS For example, power plants are the largest
human-caused source of mercury pollution. 19 Mercury is dangerous
to fetal development,20 which is why pregnant women need to avoid
fish caught in many waters in the United States. 21 The potential
health consequences of other metals are largely unknown, but the
EPA has concluded that some hazardous air toxins pose health risks
that require further study, including dioxins, arsenic, and nicke1. 22
In addition, there is considerable environmental damage
associated with the sources of fuel used in generating electricity.
For example, the production of coal requires disposal of
"overburden," a material that must be removed in order to mine
coal, without damaging water sources or filling in wetlands. Such
13. AM. LUNG AsS'N, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RECENT STUDIES OF THE
HEALTH EFFECTS OF OZONE AIR POLLUTION 1997-2001, at 1 (2001), available at
http://www.lungusa.org!atflcfl{7ABD42C2-FCCA-4604-BADE-7F5D5E762256}1
OZONE_HEALTH97-01.PDF.
14. EPA, Impacts of NOx, supra note 12.
15. Id.
16.

[d.

17. Sierra Club, Clean Air Factsheet: Dirty Coal Power, at
http://www.sierraclub.org!cleanair/factsheetslpower.asp (last visited Mar. 26,
2005).
lB. CLEAR THE AIR, TOXIC POWER, supra note 6, at 7.
19. EPA, Mercury: Controlling Power Plant Emissions; Overview, at
http://www.epa.gov/mercury/controLemissionsiindex.htm (last updated Mar. 17,
2005).
20. EPA, Mercury: Human Health, at http://www.epa.gov/mercury/
health.htm (last updated Dec. 1, 2004).
21. See EPA, FACTSHEET: NATIONAL LISTING OF FISH ADVISORIES 4 (2004),
available at http://www.epa.gov/ost/fish/advisorieslfactsheet.pdf.
22. CLEAR THE AIR, TOXIC POWER, supra note 6, at B.
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23

side effects have been a problem in the past.
Further, when
mining results in the exposure of pyrite, which is commonly found in
rocks containing coal seams, to air and water, it results in the
formation of sulfuric acid and iron hydroxide. When rainwater
washes over these rocks, the water runoff, which becomes acidified,
can harm the soil, rivers and streams. 24 Abandoned mines are also a
considerable problem. There are environmental problems caused by
abandoned mines in each of the twenty-nine states and tribal lands
with coal mines. 25
All of these environmental threats and others are subject to
government regulation intended to reduce or mitigate them.
Nevertheless, environmental advocates contend that the magnitude
of current problems is greater than it would be if there were more
effective laws and enforcement. 26 While we agree with that
conclusion, we also think that continued reliance on the Traditional
Model of electricity generation and distribution is a culprit and that
efforts to reform the Traditional Model are unlikely to improve the
situation. To understand why this is the case, we turn next to the
rise and reformulation of the Traditional Model.
III. THE TRADITIONAL MODEL
The electricity industry-like other network industries, such as
telecommunications and natural gas-has exhibited a discernable
historic pattern. 27 That pattern is the result of a combination of
technological developments, economic theory, and supporting
government regulations. 28 Regardless of the particular network
industry, these three elements have given rise to an industrial
structure and a regulatory regime with remarkable persistence.
Indeed, United States energy policy is dominated by that industrial

23. Envtl. Literacy Council, Coal Mining, at http://www.enviroliteracy.
org/article.php/1122.html (last updated Mar. 31, 2004).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Dirty Skies: The Bush
Administration's
Air
Pollution
Plan,
at
http://www.nrdc.org/air/
pollutionlqbushplan.asp (last revised Sept. 5, 2003).
27. See generally JOSE A. GoMEz-IBANEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE:
MONOPOLY, CONTRACTS, AND DISCRETION (2003); Joseph P. Tomain,
networkindustries.gov.reg, 48 U. RAN. L. REV. 829 (2000) (discussing the parallel
historical development of the transportation, communications, financial, and
energy industries).
28. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great
Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 13831403 (1998).
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structure and regulatory regime,29 and public utilities, including
electricity, have been a part of that system.
In this section, we briefly describe the technological,
commercial, and legal developments that gave rise to the
Traditional Model and the changes in these elements that have
spurred the current effort to restructure electricity markets. We
find that the current focus is on creating competitive generation
markets and the capacity to move electricity generated in those
markets around the country. Much less attention is being paid to
taking advantage of the disintegration of the Traditional Model to
adopt more environmentally friendly methods of electricity
generation and consumption.
A.

Brief History
The story of electricity is a particularly interesting one,
involving colorful characters from the very inception of the industry
right up until today's headlines. Imagine the classic American
inventor Thomas Edison toiling at his workshop in Menlo Park, New
Jersey, inventing the incandescent light bulb. While this picture of
Edison is an accurate one, it is also a partial one. Edison was a
remarkable inventor; he was also quite a business genius. Once the
incandescent light bulb was invented, it was necessary to illuminate
that bulb with electricity. Edison's plan to use the dynamo,30 a

29. See Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy
Policy, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 355 (1990).
30. The most literary description of the machine that creates electricity is
in a chapter called "The Dynamo and the Virgin" in HENRY ADAMS, THE
EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1907), reprinted in HENRY
ADAMS, NOVELS, MONT SAINT MICHEL; THE EDUCATION: DEMOCRACY: AN
AMERICAN NOVEL, ESTHER: A NOVEL, MONT SAINT MICHEL AND CHARTRES, THE
EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS, POEMS, at 1067 (Library of America ed., 1983):
To him, the dynamo itself was but an ingenious channel for conveying
somewhere the heat latent in a few tons of poor coal hidden in a dirty
engine-house carefully kept out of sight; but to Adams the dynamo
became a symbol of infinity. As he grew accustomed to the great
gallery of machines, he began to feel the forty-foot dynamos as a moral
force, much as the early Christians felt the Cross. The planet itself
seemed less impressive, in its old-fashioned, deliberate, annual or
daily revolution, than this huge wheel, revolving within arm's length,
at some vertiginous speed, and barely murmuring,-scarcely
humming an audible warning to stand a hair's-breadth further for
respect of power,-while it would not wake the baby lying close
against its frame. Before the end, one began to pray to it; inherited
instinct taught the natural expression of man before silent and
infinite force. Among the thousand symbols of ultimate energy, the
dynamo was not so human as some, but it was the most expressive.
[d. at 1067.
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turbine motor, to generate electricity, came to fruition on September
31
4, 1882 in Lower Manhattan at Pearl Street Station. On that day,
the electric industry was born. Edison flipped the switch on the
country's first central power station thus serving eighty-five
customers with four hundred electric lamps.32
While it is the case that Edison did not invent either the electric
light or electricity, it was his particular genius to develop product
distribution. 33 Edison's business genius was the construction of the
distribution system to deliver the electricity to light the lights. More
specifically, Edison favored direct current ("DC") electricity because
of its safer low voltage. Edison's commitment to direct current,
ironically, could have ended his career because that commitment
created serious competitors who recognized that DC electricity had
severe technological limitations. 34 Specifically, DC could be used to
transmit low voltage electricity only for short distances. 35
In order to transmit higher-voltage electricity longer distances,
a technological fix was necessary. High-voltage electricity had to be
converted to lower voltages so that it could be distributed to end
users. This change in voltage was mediated through a transformer
which depended upon alternating current ("AC"). Nicola Tesla
invented just such an AC system. Tesla, fired by Edison, went to
work for George Westinghouse, a keen Pittsburgh inventor and
entrepreneur, who saw the value in AC. 36 As the story goes, Edison
was so enamored with DC that he hired somebody to develop an AC
electric chair as to prove how dangerous and undesirable AC
electricity was. 37
The ACIDC battle is more than a story of rival technologies; it
involves the development of the electricity industry. In short, at the
turn of the nineteenth century, the electric industry was competitive
and highly localized. Since electricity could be transmitted longer
distances, however, the economics of competition changed
dramatically. The most significant person to recognize the changing

31 JILL JONNES, EMPIRES OF LIGHT: EDISON, TEsLA, WESTINGHOUSE, AND THE
RACE TO ELECTRIFY THE WORLD 84-85 (2003).
32. LEONARD S. HYMAN ET AL., AMERICA'S ELECTRIC UTILITIES: PAST,
PRESENT, AND FuTuRE 117 (7th ed. 2000).
33. Id. at 115-17.
34. See JONNES, supra note 31, at 144-46, 150-63, 179-83.
35. Ironically, as today's electricity policy discussions focus on more
localized generation, there is renewed interest in DC electricity connections to
the grid. See PETER VAN DOREN & JERRY TAYLOR, CATO INST., POLICY ANALYSIS
No. 530: RETHINKING ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING 10 (2004), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubslpaslpa530.pdf; infra notes 79-80 & accompanying text.
36. JONNES, supra note 31, at 153-63.
37. Id. at 197-98.
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economics of the electric industry at the time was Samuel Insull,
who had also once worked for Thomas Edison. Insull recognized
that profits could be made in the electric industry once two
fundamental costs were recouped: fixed costs and operating costs. 3S
The electric industry, like other network industries, has high
front-end capital costs. Significant investment must be made in
plants and equipment before production can begin. These capital
costs are particularly sensitive in the electric industry because it is
difficult to store electricity in any significant quantity. You need
only think of the battery on your laptop computer to realize how
frequently it must be charged. Because end users for manufacturing
purposes or home convenience need a reliable supply of electricity, it
became necessary to build sufficient generation plants so that
service could be delivered without interruption.
Additionally,
generation plants are expensive, costing millions of dollars at the
beginning of the twentieth century and hundreds of millions of
dollars today. Thus, there are high fixed costs. By comparison,
there are comparatively low operating costs, including costs for fuel,
labor and the like. Nevertheless, both of these costs need to be
recouped in order to have a profitable firm.
Insull recognized that by charging users relatively higher prices
at the beginning of a use period and then lowering prices with more
consumption, he could capture both fixed and operating costs. Such
a pricing scheme also induces consumption.
Insull was a
remarkably successful businessman, perhaps too successful. As his
electricity conglomerate grew, he created a series of holding
companies along a pyramid scheme. Those holding companies
created enormous profits right up until the Great Crash of 1929,
after which time Insull was accused of stock manipulation and
fraud. Insull fled the country only to return to face trial. Insull was
acquitted of all charges but never recovered his good name, and he
died a pauper. Today, Insull's legacy is that the industry operates
under holding company restrictions. 39 However, the scandal du
jour-Kenneth Lay and Enron-bears remarkable similarities to
Insull's empire. 40
The point of this brief history is a simple one. The electric
industry started competitively. However, technological change gave
rise to a change in corporate form primarily through concentration,
which led to manipulation. And with manipulation came cries for
38. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 122.
39. As a result of Insull's market manipulation, Congress passed the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z (2000).
40. See Richard D. Cudahy, Insult and Enron: Is There a Parallel? (pts. 13), INFRASTRUCTURE, Spring 2003, at 3, Summer 2003, at 1, Fall 2003, at 7.
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government regulation. 41 It is at this point in the electricity story
that economic theory takes the stage, for economic theory justified
government regulation.
Insull's economic instincts were not wrong. Concentration is
more efficient for certain industries according to the economic theory
of naturat" monopoly. Natural monopoly can be most simply defined
as a situation in which, for some period of time, product costs "will
be lower if they consist in a single supplier.,,42 While there are more
technical definitions of natural monopoly,43 the simple, fundamental
idea is that a single firm can realize economies of scale throughout a
range of production, thus continually lowering product cost. The
idea is straightforward: It is wasteful for a firm to make large
capital investments in facilities that will duplicate another firm's
facilities. There is no need to have multiple sets of telephone lines,
electric lines, or natural gas pipelines serving the same geographic
44
area because the duplicate sets are inefficient and will go to waste.
It is fair to note that the concept of natural monopoly is hardly
universally accepted,45 although it has been accepted in law.
41. Historically, there has been debate about whether public utility
regulation was undertaken for the benefit of the public along a public interest
model of regulation or was undertaken at the behest of the utilities themselves
along a capture theory model.
See WERNER TROESKEN, WHY REGULATE
UTILITIES?: THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THE CHICAGO GAS INDUSTRY,
1849-1924, at 3-4 (1996); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation:
Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 65-66 (1998);
George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of
Regulation" Debate, 36 J. L. & ECON. 289, 289-90 (1993); Thomas P. Lyon,
Capture or Contract?: The Early Years of Electric Utility Regulation 1-3 (Jan.
30, 2003) (working paper), available at http://papers.ssm.com/soI3/papers.
cfm?abstracUd=375628.
42. 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS 11 (1970).
43. See generally SANFORD V. BERG & JOHN TSCHIRHART, NATURAL
MONOPOLY REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 21-24 (1988); WILLIAM W.
SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 2-4 (1982); ROGER SHERMAN, THE
REGULATION OF MONOPOLY 81 (1989); W. KIp VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 80-81 (2d ed. 1995); Paul L. Joskow, Regulation of
Natural Monopolies, in HANDBOOK OF LAw AND ECONOMICS 1, 7-8 (A.M. Polinsky
& S. Shavell eds., forthcoming 2005), available at http://econ-www.mit.edul
faculty/download_pdf.php?id=1086.
44. See, e.g., Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d
119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (describing the "wasteful duplication of
facilities" created by the "competitive free-for-all" that exists before a single
provider emerges from the struggle to serve the whole market).
45. For a critique of natural monopoly, see Peter Z. Grossman, Is Anything
a Natural Monopoly?, in THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND
COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 11-39 (Peter Z. Grossman &
Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003); Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J. L. &
HeinOnline -- 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 506 2005
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The United States Supreme Court, drawing on earlier English
precedent, accepted the idea of natural monopoly in the case of
Munn v. Illinois,46 in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of
an Illinois statute regulating the prices charged by grain elevator
operators against a takings challenge. 47 Grain elevators would
purchase and store farmers' grain and then resell it for a profit. 48
Because the grain elevators were an effective oligopoly, the farmers
argued that they were being overcharged for storage. In response,
the Illinois legislature decided to regulate the prices charged by the
operators. Munn stands for the proposition that there are certain
industries "affected with a public interest')49 whose prices can be
regulated for the public good. To satisfy the test in Munn, a
proposed price regulation must show first that the industry exhibits
monopolistic tendencies and second that the industry is affected
with a public interest. Electricity clearly satisfies both tests: Insull's
consolidated electricity empire demonstrated that it could exercise
monopoly power, and legislators around the country found that the
public enjoyed the comforts of the product. Regulation, then, was
not far behind.
Thus far, we have shown how technological innovation and
economic theory contributed to the development of the electricity
industry. We now look at how government regulation responded to
those developments and how it has contributed to our current
industrial structure.
Again, we can turn to Insull for the central insight into how and
why the government regulated the electric industry the way that it
did. It is the case that a single producer of electricity can produce
electricity at a lower cost than multiple producers. However, that
single producer most likely will become a monopolist.
The
regulatory response to this exercise of monopoly power may seem
counterintuitive.
The regulatory response was to impose a
government-sanctioned monopoly on that single provider through
50
what has come to be known as the regulatory compact. The terms
of the compact are fairly simple. An electric utility is given an
exclusive franchise area and is obligated to provide service within
that franchise area. The government, to counteract monopolistic
ECON. 55, 56-59 (1968).
46. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
47. Id. at 135-36.
48. Id. at 117-18.
49. Id. at 126.
50. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (Starr, J. concurring); J. GREGORY SmAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER,
DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE
TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1997).
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pricing, is then given ratemaking authority over the electric utility.
Ratemaking is a shorthand way of saying that the government
controls utility prices and profits. Recall Insull's understanding of
utility economics as encompassing the need to cover both fixed and
operating costs and doing so through high charges at the beginning
of a user's consumption. Government regulators bought this theory
wholesale in the rate making process.
To encourage continued investment in utilities, regulators
designed what we refer to as the traditional rate formula that
allowed utilities to recover operating costs and a return on
investment on all capital costs. Such ratemaking is a form of costplus pricing. Known as cost-of-service ("COS") ratemaking, the
traditional formula functioned in such a way that as long as a public
utility operated prudently and, for the most part, as long as
customers received service, then a utility would stay in business. 51
COS ratemaking had another feature which favored industrial
growth and expansion: declining block rate design.
Utility
customers are charged for the amount of electricity that they
consume and for the cost of providing the service. However, as we
will develop in much more detail in Part V, customers do not pay for
exactly the electricity that they consume at the time that they
consume it. Rather, they pay an average cost and do so in "blocks."
Again, Insull had the central insight. Customers, under the
declining block rate design, pay more for the first block of electricity
that they consume and less for additional blocks. 52 In this way, the
utility has the opportunity to recover the more expensive capital
costs in the beginning of the consumption period before going on to
recover operating costs.
For an investor, COS ratemaking may look too good to be true.
Although there was no guarantee that a profit would be made, rarely
were profits lost. For many years the market reflected this low risk

51. See generally J. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PuBLIC UTILITY RATES
(2d ed. 1988); CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PuBLIC UTILITIES:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 435-36 (3d ed. 1993); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P.
TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAw AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 107-15 (3d ed.
2003).
52. By way of example, assume that a consumer uses 2000 kilowatt-hours
("kWh") in a month. Under a declining block rate design, they would then pay:
1st 650 kWh
4.782¢
Next 350 kWh
4.104¢
Over 1,000 kWh
4.040¢
Total $85.847
Combined, the average rate is $0.0427 per kWh. This rate design is such that
the more a user consumes, the less costly the electricity becomes, thus
encouraging consumption. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 289.
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investment with low, although reliable, rates of return to utility
investors, and every diversified portfolio contained some utility
stocks or bonds. 53
The situation of reliable utility returns existed for most of the
twentieth century, and utilities were considered safe investments as
electricity rates stayed flat or even declined as the industry
expanded. In the mid-1960s, however, the industry experienced
another transformation, a transformation with which we continue to
Until that time, particularly after World War II,
wrestle. 54
electricity production and consumption increased at a predictable
seven percent annual rate. After the mid-1960s, however, the
industry and the world changed. The electricity demand growth
rate slowed, energy costs increased, world energy prices were
thrown into disarray for various political reasons, and regulators
began to question COS ratemaking and the prevailing declining
block rate design. A simple way of understanding the cataclysm
that the electric industry was experiencing is to realize that one
cannot continue to invest capital forever. There will come a point at
which further investment is unwise because it is inefficient. The
limit of utility investments was modeled by two economists, Harvey
Averch and Leland Johnson. 55
In the mid-1960s and early 1970s, the suspicion was that the
electric industry had over-built and that it had significant excess
capacity. Historically, because of the need to provide electricity on
demand and because of an obligation for reliable service, the
industry would over-build and have its excess capacity accounted for
in what is known as a reserve margin. In other words, a utility
invested in an excess plant so that it could satisfy demand. That
excess plant constituted the reserve margin. Historic reserve
margins during the decades of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s ranged
56
from 23.8% to 31.8% and fell to 19.9% during the 1990s.
The
question then became: Were the reserve margins too high, and could
they be lowered? The suspicion was that they were too high and
that the possibility existed for lower cost electricity. The problem,
however, was that utilities were granted government protected
franchises, thus discouraging new entrants. The electric industry
was surprised by the reaction to a piece of legislation known as the

53. BENJAMIN GRAHAM ET AL., SECURITY ANALYSIS:
TECHNIQUE 1-20,264-307 (1962).
54. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 163-79.

PRINCIPLES

AND

55. Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under
Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962).
56. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 33 tb1.3-1. Reserve margins peaked in
the early 1980s and have been declining ever since. [d. at 63 fig.6-1.
HeinOnline -- 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 509 2005

510

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA"),57 which was part
of President Jimmy Carter's National Energy Act legislation of
1978. 58
The National Energy Act was intended to be comprehensive and
to respond to the energy crises that affected energy prices and the
economy more generally during the 1970s. 59 President Carter's
legislation had several purposes, including responding to growing
dependence on foreign oil, finding alternative sources of energy, and
engaging in resource conservation and energy preservation
measures. PURPA was intended to experiment with innovative
ratemaking and rate designs.
PURPA was intended to move away from COS ratemaking and
to try market-based rate strategies. As part of the rate regulation
reform, PURPA encouraged new forms of electricity generation,
including the promotion of small power producers and cogenerators. 60
Co-generation is the situation in which the
manufacturer generates excess heat from its manufacturing activity,
which can then be converted into electricity.
Small power
producers, generators of eighty megawatts ("MW") and less, and cogenerators were encouraged to enter the market and to connect to
the local public utility with a guarantee that the local public utility
would pay for the electricity generated by these two "qualifying
facilities" at the utilities' own avoided cost. In other words, these
new producers would produce electricity more cheaply than that
produced by the local utility, but the local utility would pay the
producers the utilities' production cost, not the production cost of the
new prod ucers. 61
What has been referred to as "PURPA's surprise,,62 is that
57. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617,92
Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 15, 16, 26, 30, 42, &
43 U.S.C.).
58. Id.; Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174-3205
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 42 U.S.C.); National Energy
Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206-88 (1978); Natural
Gas Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350-3411 (1978); Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289-3349.
59. The key events were the Arab Oil Embargo in 1973 and the Iranian
Embargo in 1979. See, e.g., PAUL ROBERTS, THE END OF OIL 100 (2004).
60. "Co-generation facility" is defined in 16 U.S.C. § 796(18)(A) (2000);
"small power production facility" is defined in 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(A). See also
Michael J. Zimmer, Cogeneration and Independent Power Production, in 3
ENERGY LAw AND TRANSACTIONS § 70.01-.16 (David J. Muchow & William A.
Mogel eds., 2003).
61. See, e.g., Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power Servo Corp., 461 U.S.
402, 406 (1983).
62. Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and Future of Electricity Regulation, 32
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suspicions about excess capacity were real, new entrants desired to
enter the market, and the industry was more competitive than was
assumed. As a result, electricity "deregulation" began in earnest.
We put the word deregulation in quotation marks to emphasize the
fact that the industry is experiencing a restructuring rather than
deregulation. What is being deregulated or what is attempting to be
deregulated is the pricing of electricity at the wholesale and retail
levels. To date, the restructuring is continuing at the wholesale
level and has been largely discontinued at the retail level. Through
a series of FERC rule-makings, the industry is indeed being
restructured at the wholesale and at the interstate levels. 63 The
restructuring activities in the states have come to something of a
halt as a result of the crisis in California in the summer of 2000.64
You may notice that until this point of electricity history, most of the
effort has been on production. This production focus has operated
under the belief that a strong pattern of energy consumption
indicates a strong economy.65 Nevertheless, the industry cannot
ENVTL. L. 435, 451-53 (2002) [hereinafter Tomain, Past and Future]; Joseph P.
Tomain, The Persistence of Natural Monopoly, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 242,
244 (2002) [hereinafter Tomain, Persistence].
63. The key regulations are F.E.RC. Order No. 888; Order No. 889; and
Order 2000. F.E.RC. Order 888, 18 C.F.R §§ 35 & 385 (1996); F.E.RC. Order
889-A, 18 C.F.R. § 37 (1997); F.E.RC. Order 889-B, 18 C.F.R § 37 (1997);
F.E.RC. Order 2000, 18 C.F.R § 35 (1999). For discussions on how these
orders operate, see Reinier H.J.H. Lock & Marlene L. Stein, Electricity
Transmission, in 3 ENERGY LAw & TRANSACTIONS §§ 81.01-.05 (David J. Muchow
& William A. Mogel eds., 1996); Floyd L. Norton IV & Gregory W. Camet,
Electricity: Open Access, Transmission & Comparability, in 4 ENERGY LAw &
TRANSACTIONS §§ 82.02-.05 (David J. Muchow & William A. Mogel eds., 2004).
64. Mike Stenglein, The Causes of California's Energy Crisis, 16 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 237,273 (2002); Tomain, Past and Future, supra note 62, at
439-42; James F. Wilson, Restructuring the Electric Power Industry: Past
Problems, Future Directions, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 232, 232 (2002).
65. See generally AMORY B. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A
DURABLE PEACE 3-24 (1977) (describing and critiquing the claim that there is a
positive correspondence between energy consumption and economic growth).
Today there is increasing interest in promoting strong economies through the
consumption of less energy. See, e.g., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE PROGRESSIVE
PRIORITIES SERIES: SECURING OUR ENERGY FuTURE (2004) [hereinafter CAP,
SECURING ENERGY FuTURE], available at http://www.americanprogress.org/atflcfl
{E9245FE4-9A2B-43C7-A521-5D6FF2E06E03}IENERGYCHAPTERpdf;
ENERGY FuTURE COALITION, CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY: CHARTING A NEW
ENERGY FuTuRE 27-29, 86-100 (2003) [hereinafter EFC, CHALLENGE AND
OPPORTUNITY], available at http://www.energyfuture coalition.org/pubslEFC
%20Report.pdf; NAT'L COMM'N ON ENERGY POLICY, ENDING THE ENERGY
STALEMATE: A BIPARTISAN STRATEGY TO MEET AMERICA'S ENERGY CHALLENGES
(2004)
[hereinafter
NCEP,
STALEMATE],
available
at
http://www .energycommission.org/ewebeditpro/itemsl082F4682. pdf;
JAMES
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function without transmission and distribution, which means that
the consumption end of the fuel cycle comes into play.

Traditional Electric Utility Regulation
Physics, firm structure, and markets combined to create what
we all know as the standard local public utility. Two physical
characteristics are key here. First, as mentioned earlier, electricity
cannot be stored effectively. Next, electricity follows the path of
least resistance rather than the shortest path. Because electrons
travel literally near the speed of light, once a switch is turned on the
electricity that is used can come from anywhere on the grid.
Consequently, electricity lacks the property characteristics that
make it amenable to bilateral contract sales. In other words, most
purchasers do not buy specific electricity from a specific producer.
Instead, consumers purchase from the grid, and the grid, in turn,
66
has the property characteristics of a commons. These two physical
characteristics, then, require that sufficient electricity is available to
satisfy demand instantaneously.
The firm structure that is consistent with those physical
characteristics, for most of the twentieth century, was the verticallyintegrated electric utility.' The local public utility, until relatively
recently, functioned as a vertically-integrated, investor-owned
business, known in the industry as an "IOU." IOU's engaged in
functions of generation, transmission, and distribution. In other
words, the public utility produced the electricity and delivered it to
end-use customers.
Natural monopoly theory neatly complemented both the
physical characteristics and the structure of the electric industry.
Local public utilities, as noted above, were in fact state-protected
monopolies that were regulated with the traditional COS rate
formula enabling them to continue to invest capital to provide
reliable and universal service. Most notably, capital investments
were encouraged so that utilities had sufficient capacity to provide
electricity during periods of peak demand. The world of the
traditional public utility was a satisfying one for all actors for a good
part of last century.67 Shareholders were happy because they were

B.

BARRETT ET AL., NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, JOBS AND THE CLIMATE
STEWARDSHIP ACT: How CURBING GLOBAL WARMING CAN INCREASE EMPLOYMENT

(2005), available at http://www.nrdc.orglgolobalwarminglcsalcsajobs.pdf; U.S.
PIRG EDUC. FuND, REDIRECTING AMERICA'S ENERGY: THE ECONOMIC AND
CONSUMER BENEFITS OF CLEAN ENERGY POLICIES 10-16 (2005), available at
http://newenergyfuture.com/reportslredirectingamericasenergy.pdf.
66. VANDoREN & TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 6-7.
67. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 151-61.
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earning reliable returns on their investment; managers were happy
as the plant continued to be built and managed; consumers were
happy because rates were reasonable, stayed flat, and on occasion
declined; and regulators were happy because there was both little to
68
do and what business they had was not politically controversia1.
This happy situation changed when costs (and rates) began to rise in
69
the mid-1960s due to a number of factors. The steady growth in
demand began to vary downward. Many utilities were faced with
nuclear power plants that were much more expensive than
anticipated. 70 Given the traditional rate formula, utility executives
were faced with quite a problem. Should they throw good money
after bad and complete the nuclear plant, convert it to a coal
generation unit, or cancel construction entirely?71 The energy crises
of the 1970s exacerbated the problem of rising costs as the country
experienced double digit inflation. Environmental regulations also
added to a utility's costs. As a direct consequence of inflation and
additional regulations, capital costs rose as well. And, as rates rose,
consumers complained.
As noted, the electric industry, as traditionally structured and
regulated, works well as long as the industry is expanding. Once,
however, costs rise because of either reaching a technological
plateau or reaching capacity, then the market can become distorted
and inefficient. Consumers can consequently suffer because they
are paying higher than efficient rates for electricity. The electricity
industry experienced exactly this confluence of events. In brief,
utilities had accumulated excess capacity, had built expensive
plants, and under the COS formula, were charging customers for
those additional costs. These events combined to put significant
pressures on politicians and regulators to address rising electricity
rates.
In the mid-1970s, after a period of significant inflation and two
energy crises, industry deregulation generally, and electric industry
deregulation in particular, became a significant matter for

68. WILLIAM GoRMLEY, THE POLITICS OF PuBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 7
(1983).
69. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 163-79.
70. See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION 29-54 (1987);
Roger D. Colton, Excess Capacity: Who Gets the Charge from the Power Plant?,
34 HAsTINGS L.J. 1133, 1141-43 (1983); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory
Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Cancelled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 497, 504 (1984).
71. See Richard J. Pierce, Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the
Judiciary Attempt to Police the Political Institutions?, 77 GEO. L.J. 2031, 2049
(1989).
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legislative attention. 72 The deregulation of telecommunications,
railroads, banking, and trucking, as well as energy industries, was
looked on as the way to improve markets and improve consumer
choice. 73 In some of those markets, deregulation was seen to have
exactly those effects. Airline deregulation, for example, increased
consumer choice, increased the number of flights, and introduced
various discount plans. Telecommunications deregulation witnessed
a "revolution" in innovation, choice, and lower rates. In other
markets, most notably for our purposes electricity, deregulation has
not been as smooth.
Deregulation in the electricity industry as a result of FERC
initiatives, both on the electric and natural gas sides of its docket,
began at the wholesale level and has moved to the distribution
segment of the industry. In order to have a completely deregulated
electricity market, of course, it is necessary that the retail segment
of the market be deregulated as well, and retail deregulation is a
story that is yet to develop, let alone conclude. 74
Deregulation across the electricity industry presents problems.
It is fair to say that electricity deregulation at the wholesale level
can proceed. PURPA and experiments with alternative energy
sources such as renewable energy indicate that there are additional
The significant amount of merger and
electricity suppliers.
acquisition activity in the industry shows that the market is viable,75
72. TOMAIN, supra note 70, at 11-12, 102-34; see also Bernard S. Black &
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in
Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 1343-50
(1993) (describing changes to electricity markets and the enactment of
legislation in the 1970s); Alfred E. Kahn, Electric Deregulation: Defining and
Ensuring Fair Competition, ELECTRICITY J. (April 1998); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
The State of the Transition to Competitive Markets in Natural Gas and
Electricity, 15 ENERGyL.J. 323,324 (1994).
73. See generally ALFRED E. KAHN, LESSONS FROM DEREGULATION:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AIRLINES AFTER THE CRUNCH (2004) (comparing the
relative effectiveness of the deregulation and regulatory policies in the airline
and telecommunications industries); DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES:
WHAT'S NEXT? (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000) (analyzing the
deregulation and remammg regulation of the airline, railroad,
telecommunications, and energy industries).
74. KENNETH ROSE, 2004 PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF ELECTRIC POWER
MARKETS 1-2 to -4 (Aug. 25, 2004), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/
hepg/Papers/Rose.2004. perf. review .elec.mkts.0804. pdf.
75. See, e.g., Dennis K. Berman & John R. Emshwiller, For Exelon, PSEG
Might Be Big Boost, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2004, at A3; Eric Dash, Exelon Plans
to Buy New Jersey Utility, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at C2; Jad Mouawad &
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Biggest Utility in New Jersey Seen as Target of
Acquisition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,2004, at C1 (reporting the potential acquisition
of New Jersey's largest utility, P.S.E.&G., by the Exelon Corporation, an owner
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and even with the collapse of Enron, energy futures trading
continues and should continue to be healthy.76
All of this activity pertains to the generation segment of the
industry. Deregulation oftransmission (and distribution) and retail
segments,
including
consumption,
remains
problematic.
Transmission is problematic as it continues to be a natural
monopoly. 77 Nevertheless, FERC initiatives are attempting to
organize reliable and accessible grids as will be described
immediately below. Distribution is problematic as states' and the
federal government's experiment with "unbundling" vehicles affects
the corporate structure of distribution companies. The California
energy crisis has given retail reformers pause, and there can be no
effective retail deregulation without unfettered access to the grid.
The consumption end of the fuel cycle presents difficulties
because all customers are not similarly situated. There are some
consumers, particularly large industrial customers, who would like
to have access to various suppliers and can negotiate adequate
contracts for themselves. Large suppliers and consumers can use
long-term contracts, spot markets, and futures markets to provide
for their electricity needs.
Small customers and residential
consumers, however, run into problems of pricing and reliability.
Under the traditional rate formula, these smaller consumers were
the beneficiaries of cross-subsidization, which lowers their real
rates. In a completely deregulated market all consumers will pay
their full electricity costs.

C.

Summary
A safe assumption about the electricity future is that the
Traditional Model will continue for some time. Nuclear power
accounts for twenty percent of the electricity produced in the
country, and coal reserves are sufficient to last for 250, 500, or even
1,000 years depending on who is making the reserve estimates. In
addition, the national electricity grid is necessary for transmission
and distribution, and large producers can produce more cheaply.
Nevertheless, the conversation has moved on to what will
replace the Traditional Model, and this question involves a number

of a number of electric utilities and an experienced manager of nuclear plants);.

see also VIJAY V. VAITHEESWARAN, POWER TO THE PEoPLE 280 (2003).
76. See, e.g., DTE Energy Trading, at http://www.dteenergytrading.com
(last visited Apr. 3, 2005) (advertising its services as an "active physical gas and
power marketing company").
77. Joseph P. Tomain, Whither Natutal Monopoly? The Case of Electricity,
in THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 111 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003).
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of important issues. Indeed, contemporary energy policy discussions
involve fundamental concerns of a different kind from those that
occupied most of the twentieth century. Today, energy policy
discussions involve growing concern about the availability and the
price of oil,7B global climate change/9 terrorism,BO and international
markets as well as a healthy energy economy.S1 By way of
shorthand, energy policy today must address energy, the
environment, and security.B2 Most significantly, today's policy
discussions must address how interconnected these variables have
become.
Clearly, continuing the Traditional Model presents
difficulties in each area. The Traditional Model has become too
costly, the United States is a net importer of oil, the Traditional
Model especially relative to coal-fired generation has contributed to
environment harms, and the Traditional Model is prone to energy
and national security threats.
Our aim is to contribute to the discussion about the future of
energy policy by focusing on what a Smart Model of electricity
generation and consumption can contribute to national well-being.
In the next part, we discuss how a Smart Model would change the

78. See, e.g., AMORY B. LOVINS ET AL., WINNING THE OIL ENDGAME:
INNOVATION FOR PROFITS, JOBS, AND SECURITY (2005), available at
http://www.oilendgame/org/pdfsIWtOEg_72dpi.pdf; PAUL ROBERTS, THE END OF
OIL: ON THE EDGE OF A PERILOUS NEW WORLD (2004).
79. See, e.g., INT'L CLIMATE CHANGE TASKFORCE, MEETING THE CLIMATE
CHALLENGE: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE
TASKFORCE (2005), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/atficfl%
7bE9245FE4-9A2B-43C7-A521-5D6FF2E06E03%7d1CLIMATECHALLENGE.
PDF; see also Press Release, Int'l Climate Change Taskforce, G8-Plus Group
Needed
to
Tackle
Climate
Change,
at
http://www.ippr.org.uk/
pressreleasesiarchive.asp?id=1264&flD=62 (Jan. 24, 2005) (urging G8 leaders
to make greenhouse gas reduction a top priority).
80. GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR TERRORISM 55-56 (2004).
81. See generally CAP, SECURING ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 65; EFC,
CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 65; NCEP, STALEMATE, supra note 65;
see also New Thinking on Energy Policy: Meeting the Challenges of Security,
Development, and Climate Change, Conference Proceedings of a William J.
Clinton Presidential Foundation Conference (Dec. 6, 2004). A video of the
forum can be found at http://www.clintonpresidentialcenter.org/feature-energy120604.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2005). Of increasing concern is the demand for
energy, particularly oil and natural gas, by China and India. See, e.g., Keith
Bradsher, 2 Big Appetites Take Seats at the Oil Table, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
2005, at C1; see also Simon Romero & Jad Mouwad, Saudis in Strategy to
Export More Oil to India and China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2005, at C4.
82. We use "security" in two senses. First, the energy policy is concerned
with reliable energy supplies to keep the nation independent, particularly from
imported oil. Second, the country's energy system must be secure from terrorist
activities.
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way in which we generate and distribute electricity. Part V
discusses how a Smart Model would change the way in which we
consume electricity.
IV.

THE SMART GENERATION MODEL

In this Part, we discuss four prominent examples of generation
of electricity under a Smart Model: distributed generation,
renewable energy, renewable portfolio standards, and the Smart
Grid. All of these options are potential improvements in the
generation and delivery of electricity that respond to the concerns
about energy, the environment, and security. While these ideas
have been part of energy policy discussions for many years, they
have stayed at the periphery of those discussions, mostly because
they have been too costly and have not passed a market test. To
date, investors have been reluctant to invest in these alternatives
because they have not been promised a sufficient return on their
investment.
One reason, we believe, for the limited attractiveness of Smart
Model generation options is the lack of accurate price signals in
electricity markets. Through greater price accuracy, which we
discuss in the next Part of the article, consumers can make smarter
consumption choices, producers can make smarter investment
decisions, and the industry can perform more efficiently. Simply,
COS ratemaking can no longer be relied upon to continue to
regulate the industry. Instead, we examine marginal cost pricing
and real time pricing models that are intended to bring prices closer
to the market and are intended to give consumers more accurate
price signals.
One other preliminary observation is pertinent. Each of the
alternatives that we discuss must connect with the transmission
and distribution grid to greater or lesser degrees. Distributed
generation needs backup access to backup power. Renewable
resources need to connect with the market. Renewable energy
portfolios have the same needs. And, the Smart Grid is an improved
grid. In other words, as much as we might like to get away from the
Traditional Model, the grid remains central to the electricity
industry, and the grid retains its natural monopoly characteristic,
thus necessitating regulation in one form or another. 83 The grid will
remain a necessary component until electricity production and
distribution become localized, and that decentralization is starting
through distributed generation. 84
83. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text; see also VAN DOREN &
TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 10.
84. See, e.g, John D. Kueck et al., Tapping Distributed Energy Resources,
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Distributed Generation
Distributed generation ("DG") is an alternative source of
86
electricity generation that focuses on small-scale power production.
The core concept behind DG is that power will be produced locally,
instead of relying on large regional grids for transmission and
distribution. DG power producers will be much smaller and will rely
on a variety of energy sources and technologies such as solar cells
and wind turbines.
DG technologies include gas or diesel-fired engines, small
turbines, fuel cells, and photovoltaic cells. 87 While some of these fuel
sources are fossil fuels, it is contemplated that DG technologies will
capture both heat and power, thereby increasing energy efficiency.
Other fuel sources are renewable and therefore cleaner than the
fossil fuels burned in large-scale plants.
DG and micropower are dependent upon significant
technological improvements throughout electricity production,
transmission, distribution, storage, and consumption. Most simply,
the scale of generation units is reduced significantly, and they are
widely dispersed. 88 "Smart energy" technologies are intended to
reduce the size of power generation units, to be closer to the source
of consumption, to utilize "Smart Grids" which will transmit power
more efficiently, and to use "smart meters" which will provide
consumers with more information about their consumption patterns
and about their choice ofproviders. 89
Another term for DG is micropower, which also involves new
technologies including microturbines, hydrogen fuels, solar cells,

PuB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 2004, at 46,47.
85. Portions of this subpart of the Article also appear in Joseph P. Tomain,
Nuclear Futures, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. (forthcoming Spring 2005).
86. The International Energy Agency defmes "distributed generation" as:
generating plant serving a customer on-site or providing support to a
distribution network, connected to the grid at distribution-level
voltages. The technologies generally include engines, small (and
micro) turbines, fuel cells, and photovoltaic systems. It generally
excludes wind power, since that is mostly produced on wind farms
rather than for on-site power requirements.
lNT'L ENERGY AGENCY, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION IN LIBERALISED ELECTRICITY
MARKETS 19 (2002), available at http://www.iea.org/textbaseinppdflfreei2000/
distributed2002.pdf [hereinafter lEA, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION]; see also SETH
DUNN, WORLDWATCH INST., MICROPOWER: THE NEXT ELECTRICAL ERA;
WORLDWATCH PAPER 151 (Jane A. Peterson ed., 2000), available at
http://www.worldwatch.org/pubslpaperI1511.html.
87. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 86, at 25-26 tbl.l; VAITHEESWARAN,
supra note 75, at 35-37.
88. VAITHEESWARAN, supra note 75, at 40-43.
89. EFC, CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 65, app.A4, at 74-85.
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landfill gases, and the like. In this regard, micropower is touted as
a clean energy alternative. According to the International Energy
Agency, these technologies are increasing in importance. For
example, "[w]orldwide, more DG capacity was ordered in 2000 than
.
90
[the capacity ordered] for new nuclear power."
Not too much
should be taken from that statement because of the decrease in
orders for new nuclear plants. Still, it is fair to assert that we are
witnessing a worldwide rise in DG and micropower. 91
Smart electricity policy is a return to the electricity future.
When Edison flipped the switch at Pearl Street Station in New York
City in 1882, the first electricity company went into operation and
did so on a small scale. 92 Technological advances enabled the
effective nationalization of the electricity grid in the early part of the
twentieth century.93 Today, we find ourselves contemplating a
return to small scale because it promises economic efficiencies by
removing producers from the grid, environmental benefits through
greater energy efficiencies and increased use of renewable energy
resources, and energy security advantages from terrorist attack,
international supply disruptions, or catastrophic accidents.

Renewable Energ/4
The discussion of renewable energy policy and resources can
trace its history to the environmental movement in the 1960s and
early 1970s. At that time, books such as A Sand County Almanac95
and Silent Spring95 created popular awareness of threats posed by
man to our natural environment. Around that time, scientists and
economists completed an influential empirical study which raised an
alarm about the irreversible consequences of continued energy
· 97
resource consumpt Ion.
Those concerns became imbedded in law in the United States

B.

90. lEA, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION, supra note 86, at 7.
91. There is also an increase in the number of smart energy providers of
information
and
products.
See,
e.g.,
Climate
Solutions,
at
http://www.climatesolutions.org (last visited Mar. 15, 2005); Environmental
Law and Policy Ctr., Smart Energy, at http://www.elpc.org/energy (last visited
Mar. 15, 2005); Smart-Energy, at http://www.smart-nrg.com (last visited Mar.
15, 2005); SmartPower, at http://www.smartpower.org (last visited Mar. 15,
2005).
92. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 115-17.
93. JONNES, supra note 31, at 367-70.
94. See generally, Richard L. Ottinger & Rebecca Williams, Renewable
Energy Sources for Development, 32 ENVT. L. 331 (2002).
95. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1949).
96. RACHAEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
97. DONELLA H. MEADOWS ET AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972).
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through the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") signed
into law by President Nixon on January 1, 1970,98 and through
associated legislation. While NEPA made the country aware of
environmental issues, the connection between energy and the
environment did not become part of the policy landscape until the
passage of President Carter's Energy Security Act of 1980. 99 The
1980 Act promoted the development of alternatives to traditional
fossil fuels in two ways. First, the government provided financial
incentives to producers of synthetic fuels, such as oil shale and tar
sands. Although they were fossil fuel resources, these synthetic
lOO
fuels provided increased independence from foreign oil sources.
The Act also promoted the development of more environmentally
benign energy sources, such as bio-mass and alcohol fuels; various
renewable energy resources; solar energy; conservation; and
geothermal energy.lOl Even with the impetus of major legislation,
neither the synfuels industry nor the renewable energy industry
was able to sustain itself financially.
The 1970s were a volatile time for our energy economy,
particularly given the OPEC Oil Embargo of 1973, the latter Iranian
embargo in 1978, and the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island in
1979. Heightened energy awareness began to generate a series of
studies of our energy future including predictions that would make
renewable energy a major part of our energy economy.102 In fact, it
was predicted that solar power would account for twenty percent of
the electricity generated by the year 2000.103 The year 2000 has

98. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2000).
99. Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of Titles 7, 10, 12, 15, 16, 30, 42, and 50 U.S.C.)
(1980). The Energy Security Act was comprised of several statutes including:
the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1980, 94 Stat. 617; the United
States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 633; the Biomass
Energy and Alcohol Fuels Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 683; the Renewable Energy
Resources Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 715; the Solar Energy and Energy Conservation
Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 719; and the Geothermal Energy Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 763.
100. United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96294, 94 Stat. 633.
101. Geothermal Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 763; Solar Energy
and Energy Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 719 (1980).
102. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Energy Policies and Their Consequences After
25 Years, ENERGY J., Nov. 4, 2003, at 17,17.
103. Modesto A. Maidique, Solar America, in ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF
THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, 231, 231 (Robert
Stobaugh & Daniel Yergin eds., Ballentine Books 1980) (1979); SAM H. SCHURR
ET AL., ENERGY IN AMERICA'S FUTURE: THE CHOICES BEFORE Us 32 (1979) (noting
that sunlight "carries more potential than any other renewable resource for
going beyond mere local or regional importance within the United States").;

c.r
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come and past and solar has not moved even a notch on the dial. To
date, solar power provides about one percent of the nation's
energy. 1M
Regardless of the dire predictions, perhaps best captured by the
book title The End of Nature/os the country is not running out of
energy/06 nor have we run out of traditional fossil fuels. It is also
the case that we have not sustained any significant renewable
energy policy.I07 This is true despite continued calls for a greater
reliance on renewable resources. lOS What is significantly different
this time around, however, is that the triple concerns of energy,
environment, and security are starting to coalesce with energy
policy thinkers, and renewable energy does playa significant role in
those new policy discussions.
When we talk about renewable energy, any number of resources
can be discussed, including hydro-power, geothermal, bio-mass and
alcohol fuels, wave power, hydrogen, and the like. Below we discuss
two particular renewable resources-solar power and wind powerbecause both present particular issues for electricity supply. In
particular, both are attractive because they are decentralized; yet,
both have two significant problems. First, anyone relying on one of
these options will want to also have a connection to the grid. Solar
energy users need the connection as a backup source of energy.
Those producing electricity using wind turbines need the connection
to be able to sell the power that they generate. In both cases, the
need to connect to the grid raises policy issues concerning
interconnection and pricing. 109 Second, although this is less true for

FORD FOUND., ENERGY: THE NEXT 20 YEARS 467 (1979) (giving an optimistic view
of solar energy in the future but noting that it was impossible at that time to
quantify its likely impact).
104. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RENEWABLE ENERGY TRENDS WITH PRELIMINARY
DATA FOR 2003, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaflsolar.
renewableslpageitrendsltrends. pdf.
105. BILL McKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE (Penguin Books ed., Viking 1990)
(1990).
106. PETER W. HUBER & MARK P. MILLS, THE BOTTOMLESS WELL: THE
TwILIGHT OF FuEL, THE VIRTUE OF WASTE, AND WHY WE WILL NEVER RUN OUT OF
ENERGY, at xv (2005).
107. Joskow, supra note 102, at 4l.
108. See DANIEL LASHOF & PATRICIO SILVA, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, A
RESPONSIBLE ENERGY POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, at vi (2001), available at
http://www .nrdc.orglair/energy/rep/rep. pdf.
109. See Larry Prete, Transmission Pricing Issues for Electricity Generation
from Renewable Resources, in RENEWABLE ENERGY 1998: ISSUES AND TRENDS 45,
50 (Energy Info. Admin. ed. 1999), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.
govlFTPROOT/renewablesl062898.pdf (explaining that wind and solar power
have "lower and more highly variable capacity factors, intermittent availability,
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wind power, both are not as cost effective as traditionally produced
electricity.llo These issues must be addressed as we consider the
design of new energy policy and the reformation of the regulatory
structure ofthe electric industry.
1. Solar Power
There are basically two types of solar energy. First, passive
solar energy, used principally for water and space heating, is a
matter of architectural design more than anything else. l l l Through
movable or immovable parts, the sun's heat is captured and stored
for the purposes listed above.
Second, through the use of
photovoltaic cells and other large solar collectors, electricity can be
generated and stored. 1l2
As noted earlier, solar power, despite a once promising future,1l3
now provides almost none of the electricity currently used in the
United States. 114 Government regulation of solar energy to date has
involved the stimulation of markets through demonstration projects
and favorable tax rates and credits. 115 Nevertheless, the market has
been static,116 and the industry is yet to be cost competitive.l17 One
reason may simply be a matter of scale. The largest solar collector
generates about fifty-five MW of electricity, which can be contrasted
with a large nuclear coal plant that generates over a thousand MW.
Nevertheless, given the ubiquity of this power source, one would
and longer distances for existing transmission lines and/or load centers").
110. Suedeen G. Kelly, Alternative Energy Sources, in ENERGY LAw AND
POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 13-1, 13-2 (James E. Hickey et aI. eds., The
Energy Law Group ed., 2000).
111. Id. at 13-6.
112. Id. at 13-3 to -4.
113. MARK GIELECKI ET AL., ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INCENTIVES, MANDATES,
AND GoVERNMENT PROGRAMS FOR PROMOTING RENEWABLE ENERGY (2001),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaflsolar.renewableslrea_issueslincent.
html.
.
114. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text
115. See, e.g., Solar Photovoltaic Energy Research, Development, and
Demonstration Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5581-5594 (2000); Solar Energy and
Energy Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 719 (2000)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 42 U.S.C.); Solar Energy
Research Development and Demonstration Act of 1974,42 U.S.C. §§ 5551-5566
(2000). According to MIT Professor Paul Joskow, "[iJn the last 25 years there
has been a plethora of federal policies to encourage alternative fuels and fueluse technologies with little to show for the efforts." Joskow, supra note 102, at
31.
116. See, e.g, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RENEWABLE ENERGY ANNUAL 2000, at 1114 (2001),
available
at
http://tonto.eia.doe.govIFTPROOT/renewables
1060300.pdf.

117. See Kelly, supra note 110, at 13-4.
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think that we could use the resource better than we do. It has been
estimated, for example, that "[i]f all the energy from the sun that
reaches the United States were harnessed ... it would provide about
500 times the nation's present energy demands.,,1l8 Moreover, not
only is solar energy safe and inexhaustible, it is not subject to
cartelization. Therefore, it provides energy security and national
security as well as providing clean electricity.

2.
Wind Energy
Wind energy is considered among the fastest growing sources of
energy today. 119 AB costs decline, wind is attractive because it
produces no air or water pollution and involves no toxic or
hazardous waste. It is estimated that wind energy in the United
States provides enough electricity to serve nearly one million
Wind does, however, present two significant
households. 120
environmental issues. The location of wind turbines can be seen as
aesthetically unattractive, and windmills pose a danger to birds.
The government currently encourages wind projects through tax
credits. 121 Most of the wind energy is currently generated in
California, and a joint industry and government organization called
the National Wind Coordinating Committee has formed to develop a
commercial market. In 1999, the Secretary of the Department of
Energy ("DOE") announced a Wind Powering America initiative that
set a goal of wind energy providing five percent of U.S. electric
power by 2020. 122
3. Summary
The United States so far has made very little use of renewable
energy sources. While there are several forms of renewable energy
resources, combined they contribute little to the country's overall
energy needs, satisfying only about two percent of the energy
supply.
Nevertheless, given the new demands on energy policy,
118. Id. at 13-3.
119. See id. at 13-20 to -22; AM.

WIND ENERGY AsS'N, FAIR TRANSMISSION
ACCESS FOR WIND: A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF PRIORITY ISSUES 1 (2000), available at

http://www.awea.org/policy/documents/transmission.PDF; Matthew L. Wald,
Wind Power Is Becoming a Better Bargain: No Fuel Cost or Pollution, but
Production Is Not Always Reliable, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at A27; DOE,
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy: FEMP Focus-Jan./Feb. 2002, at
http://www.eere.energy.gov/femp/newseventslfempfocus_article.cfmlnews_id=
7169 (last visited Apr. 3, 2005) [hereinafter DOE, FEMP Focus].
120 DOE, FEMP Focus, supra note 119.
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 13317 (2000).
122. AM. WIND ENERGY AsS'N, supra note 119, at 1.
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renewable resources are again coming to the fore in policy
discussions. Such resources are attractive insofar as they are noncarbon and therefore do not contribute to climate change. They are
also small-scale, dispersed, and local. Consequently, they go counter
to the Traditional Model, and they present fewer security risks.
The troubling aspect of wind power and solar power deals is
reliability. 123 Because of the vagaries of weather, neither resource
will be continually producing electricity. Consequently, consumers
may not be availed of reliable electricity from those sources. More
problematic is that connections to the grid124 become difficult and
may even pose threats to wind turbines. These issues will have to
be resolved if we are to increase our reliance on renewable sources of
energy.
At the moment, however, the huge stumbling block is that many
renewable resources are not close to being cost competitive with
fossil fuels. Still, their attractions are considerable, and they are
part of contemporary energy thought. 125

c.

Renewable Portfolio Standards
According to the federal government, a renewable portfolio
standard ("RPS") is a "market-based strategy to ensure that
renewable energy constitutes a certain percentage of total energy
generation or consumption."126 The government creates a RPS when
it requires electricity generators or sellers to supply a percentage of
their electricity generation or sales with electricity from renewable
resources or technologies. Although there are no federal RPS
programs to date,127 they are operating in various states. As of 2004,
eighteen states had programs in place. 128
Acknowledging that the renewable resources are often not cost
123. Lovins argues to the contrary, however, that reliability is less of a
problem than the critics make it. LoVINS, supra note 65, § 2.5, at 44-45.
124. See FERC, Interconnection for Wind Energy and Other Alternative
Technologies, 70 Fed. Reg. 4791, 4793-94 (proposed Jan. 24, 2005) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
125. See CAP, SECURING ENERGY FuTuRE, supra note 65, at 12; EFC,
CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 65, at 16; NCEP, STALEMATE, supra
note 65, at 62.
126. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., THE CHALLENGES OF ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY
RESTRUCTURING
FOR
FuEL
SUPPLIERS
73
(1998),
available
at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/electricity/chg_str3uel.pdf.
127. There is, however, a federal RPS proposal that would require 5.5% of
electricity to be generated from renewable sources by 2010. Sellers would be
able to meet the RPS requirement either by generating renewable electricity
themselves or by purchasing tradable renewable electricity credits. Id.; see also
Exec. Order No. 13,123, 64 Fed. Reg. 30,851 (June 3, 1999).
128. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 104, at 3.
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competitive with traditional resources does not end consideration of
them in our energy future. Rather, the question becomes how to
encourage the development and deployment of smaller, cleaner
renewable energy resources and technologies.
A standard
regulatory response is through subsidies, financial incentives,
129
standards, and other regulatory devices.
State governments have
developed a different response through standard setting.
In
particular, several state governments now require that electricity
producers must provide specified percentages of generation from
renewable energy sources by specified dates.
As examples,
California has set a target portfolio requirement of twenty percent
by 2017, and Maine set a thirty percent goal to be achieved by
2000. 130 Hydroelectricity, however, is included in Maine's definition
of renewable resources. Often, RPS programs include a trading
provision through which regulated firms can trade renewable energy
credits, thus creating a market like the emissions trading market.
This market gives producers more flexibility in meeting the
standards imposed upon them because a generator that cannot meet
its requirement can purchase credits, while generators that can
exceed the goal will sell credits.
RPS programs can be designed such as to encourage the
development and use of particular technologies. Nevada, for
example, encourages the use of photovoltaic cells by giving literally
extra credits for electricity produced by those cells. 131

D.

Smart Electricity Grids
Each of the previous smart energy activities depends on a
reliable distribution system, and the grid is in need of improvement
as attested to by the August 2003 Blackout. 132 New technologies,
under the rubric "Smart Grid," promise to improve the grid and
enable it to move electricity more efficiently and more effectively.
The Smart Grid promises "important economic, security, and
environmental benefits by promoting substantial upgrades to the
performance of the transmission and distribution network that

129. See Mark Gielecki et al., Incentives, Mandates, and Government
Programs for Promoting Renewable Energy, in ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
RENEWABLE ENERGY 2000: ISSUES AND TRENDS 1-17 (2001), available at
http://www .eia.doe.gov/cneaflsolar.renewableslrea_issuesl062800. pdf.
130. See Everett Britt, Renewable Electric Generation 2004: Incentives,
Obligations, and Concerns, NAT. RESOURCES. & ENV'T, Winter 2005, at 34, 35.
131. Id. at 35.
132. See U.S.-CAN. POWER SYSTEM OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON
THE AUGUST 14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: CAUSES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2004), available at https://reports.energy.govlBlackout
Final-Web.pdf.
HeinOnline -- 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 525 2005

526

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

connects electricity generators and consumers.,,133 Contemporary
thinking, then, integrates energy, environment, and security into
the distribution and transmission system by incorporating
"sophisticated sensing and monitoring technology, information
technology, and communications to provide better grid performance
and to support a wide array of additional services to consumers.,,134
There is a general consensus that investment in the electricity
135
infrastructure is lagging behind our electricity needs and that
additional, more reliable, transmission and distribution capacity is
necessary. Given the need for a system upgrade, there is no reason
not to improve upon the technology while simultaneously addressing
environmental and security needs. Such improvements can occur
through the so-called Smart Grid that involves:
• Infrastructure with "smarter" controls to support robust
market activity; rapid recovery from cascading outages,
natural disasters and potential terrorist attacks;136
133. EFC, CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 65, at 75.
134. [d.; see also ELEC. POWER RES. INST., ELECTRICITY TECHNOLOGY
ROADMAP: MEETING THE CRITICAL CHALLENGES OF THE 21sT CENTURY: 2003
SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS 1-4 (2003) [hereinafter ELEC. POWER RES. INST.,
ROADMAP], available at http://www.epri.com/roadmap/viewpdfs.asp.
The
Electric Power Research Institute claims:
[aJ truly "smart" power delivery system will include automated
capabilities to anticipate problems, find solutions, and optimize
performance ... The basic building blocks include advanced sensors for
wide-area system monitoring and control, faster-than-real-time data
processing and pattern recognition software, solid-state power flow
controllers, and two-way energy/information consumer access portals.
[d.; see also NAT'L COMM'N ON ENERGY POLICY, REVIVING THE ELECTRICITY
SECTOR: FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ENERGY POLICY 4-5, 8
(2003),
available at http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdflenvironment_energy_
policy_0903.pdf.
135. ELEC. POWER RES. INST., ROADMAP, supra note 134, at 1-1; Kueck, supra
note 84, at 48; Joskow, supra note 102, at 23; EFC, CHALLENGE AND
OPPORTUNITY, supra note 65, at 76; ERIC HIRST, EDISON ELEC. INST., U.S.
TRANSMISSION CAPACITY: PRESENT STATUS AND FuTuRE PROSPECTS 1 (2004),
available
at
http://www.eei.orglindustry_issues/energy_infrastructure!
transmissionlUSTransCapacity10-18-04.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL
TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY 25 (2002), available at http://www.eh.doe.
gov/ntgs/gridstudy /main_print.pdf; see also PAUL J. HIBBARD, ANALYSIS GROUP,
INC., U.S. ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE: DEMAND, SUPPLY AND FACILITY SITING:
REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ENERGY POLICY 2 (2004), available at
http://64.70. 252.93/082F4698.pdf.
136. This capacity is also know as a "self-healing" grid. "A self-healing grid
integrates real-time information from embedded sensors with distributed
intelligence and automated control, enabling the system to respond
automatically to disruptive events and attacks to the system."
EFC,
CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 65, at 77.
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•

High quality and highly reliable electricity for our digital
economy;
• An infrastructure connected with advanced communications
to form an energy web;
• An energy web which increases economic productivity;
• "Clean... power generation technologies" and "universal
access to affordable electricity.,,137
Smart Grid technologies are attractive not only because they
are responsive to the increasing environmental sensitivity of
progressive electricity policies but also because they increase grid
security and contribute to greater demand sensitivities. Security is
heightened as the grid operates more rapidly to recognize and
isolate problem areas. The Smart Grid will also be one that can
easily accommodate distributed and small-scale generation
technologies, which, by their size alone, make less attractive targets.
The Smart Grid is intended to be consumer friendly in other ways as
well by providing communications and power to "smart" buildings to
make the most intelligent use of equipment. 13B Such portals enable
residential, commercial and industrial customers to "manage
electricity use in a manner that improves efficiency and reduces
consumer energy costs, while at the same time enhancing customer
control of electrical equipment."139 In the next sub-part, we address
electricity pricing and the Smart Grid together with smart metering.
Together these technologies facilitate real-time pricing thus giving
consumers more accurate price signals.
To be sure, the Smart Grid is a matter of our electricity future,
not a current reality. To become a reality certain recommendations
have been made including:
• The DOE should be charged with establishing a clear vision
and set of goals for the development of the Smart Grid
through a program of regional and local demonstrations
projects.
137. ELEC. POWER RES. INST., ROADMAP, supra note 134, at 2-2; see EFC,
CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 65, at 78-79; NCEP, STALEMATE,
supra note 65, at 94.
138. "The GridWise Alliance is a consortium of public and private
stakeholders," whose mission it is to "provide real-world technology solutions to
support the U.S. Department of Energy's vision of a transformed national
electric system."
See Gridwise Alliance, The Gridwise Alliance, at
http://www.gridwise.org/index.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2005). The alliance
envisions an electric system that will "employ new distributed 'plug and play'
technologies using advanced telecommunications, information and control
approaches to create a society of devices that functions as an integrated
trans active system." [d.
139. EFC, CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 65, at 78.
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•

Appropriate technical and reliability standards must be
devised and adopted (the North American Electric Reliability
Council can be tasked with this recommendation).
• A Twenty-First Century Electricity System Security and
Modernization Fund should be created to fund the necessary
14o
investment in research and development.
To the end of modernizing the electric grid, the DOE has
announced its support of technological innovations in transmission,
communications and information, and siting. 141 The DOE proposes a
National Electric Delivery Technologies Roadmap/42 which will be a
combined government and industry undertaking to improve
electricity transmission.

v.

THE SMART CONSUMPTION MODEL

A smart electricity generation policy will not displace the
Traditional Model. It is, however, responsive to protecting the
environment and serving other important national interests. The
evaluative test for the success of the smart generation alternatives
will come in the market, and, for this reason as well as others, the
market must contain a pricing mechanism that is cost sensitive. We
therefore turn next to new thinking about electricity pricing.
More specifically, this section investigates the potential of
marginal cost pricing to promote energy conservation. Our analysis
reveals that marginal cost pricing requires the installation of new
meters that should result in significant energy conservation, which
in turn will reduce some of the environment harm associated with
electricity generation, and that the benefits of reduced consumption
should outweigh the problems of achieving it.
A.

Meters and Prices
Most retail consumers purchase electricity according to how
much electricity they consume over some period of time, usually a
month. 143 The price usually does not vary, except possibly for fuel
costs,l44 even if the cost of producing the electricity goes up because
140. These last three recommendations are those of the Energy Future
Coalition. [d. at 80-84.
141. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, "GRID
ELECTRICITY'S
SECOND
100
YEARS

2030": A NATIONAL VISION FOR
27-28
(2003),
available
at

http://www.electricity.doe.gov/documentslElectric_Vision_Document. pdf;
see
also Michael T. Burr, The Digitized Grid: Data Gathering and Controllability
Offer the Quickest Path to Reliability, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 2005, at 26,27.
142. See, e.g., ELEC. POWER RES. lNST., ROADMAP, supra note 134, at vii.
143. Moot, supra note 4, at 315.
144. See, e.g, MIDAMERICAN ENERGY CO., SCHEDULE OF RATES FOR ELECTRIC
SERVICE IN ILLINOIS, RIDER No.2 ELECTRIC FuEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE 17 (1995),
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retail prices are based on the average cost of producing and
delivering electricity. By comparison, electricity production costs
vary significantly by hour in almost all systems across the
145
country.
Average cost pricing is used in large part because marginal cost
pricing requires the use of meters that measure the time of day that
electricity is consumed. 146 If electricity prices are based on marginal
costs, consumers will have an incentive to reduce electricity use
during periods of peak demand or to switch to less expensive sources
of energy because the cost of generating and delivering electricity is
147
normally greater during such peaks.
There is little marginal cost
pricing in both regulated and unregulated generation markets
because neither market generally employs meters that measure
time-of-day demand. 148

Regulated Markets
Consumers do not pay any more for electricity when the costs of
generating and delivering it increase in regulated markets (except
for fuel costs) because the normal method of setting utility prices
uses average cost. Regulators, however, could adopt marginal cost
pricing if they required utilities to install time-of-use meters.
1.

a. Traditional Regulation. Under cost-of-service ratemaking,
regulators first determine the revenue requirement of a utility.149
Regulators calculate the revenue requirement by estimating the cost
of producing electricity and how much money the utility must earn
to provide a sufficient rate of return for stockholders and
bondholders who invest in the company. 150 Once the revenue
requirement is determined, regulators determine the price that the
utility can charge for each unit of electricity. Regulators can do this
by dividing the revenue requirement by the quantity of electricity
that they estimate the utility will sell, but regulators may also make
adjustments to reflect differences in the cost of producing and
transmitting electricity. 151 For example, a commission will set a
lower price for large industrial users because it is less expensive for
a utility to deliver a large volume of electricity to one location than
available at http://www.midamericanenergy.com/pdflrateslelecrates/ilelectriC/
17-17.30.pdf.
145. See David Nichols & John Stutz, Load Response: New, or Deja Vu?,
ELECTRICITY J., May 2001, at 73, 74.
146. Moot, supra note 4, at 315.
147. See infra notes 176-205 and accompanying text.
148. Moot, supra note 4, at 315.
149. See SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 51, at 109.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 113.
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much smaller amounts to thousands of households. None of these
prices reflect actual marginal costs since they are based on
regulators' estimates of the differences in cost of providing service to
different classes of customers. More importantly, once a price is
established for a class of customers, it does not change over the
period of time in which it is in effect.152 In other words, price is the
average cost of producing electricity for that class of customers.
Thus, even after these adjustments, other than the actual fIxed price
paid, there is no further incentive for any class of consumers under
this regulatory system to use less electricity when the cost of
producing it rises.
The current method of structuring prices does not take into
account that the cost of producing electricity normally increases
during periods of peak demand. The cost goes up for several
reasons.
During periods of peak demand, electrical utilities
typically include older, more inefficient generation plants in their
portfolio of generators, which are not normally used because they
are more expensive to operate and because they cause more air
pollution than other generation units. l53 In restructured electricity
markets, local utilities can purchase additional supplies of
electricity from other generators, but the cost of electricity
purchased from other suppliers can be expected to rise as demand
increases unless there is sufficient excess efficient generation.
Furthermore, the marginal transportation costs rise according to the
distance over which electricity is transported because megawatts
are lost in the act of transmitting electricity.154 In addition, the cost
of transmission increases because high demand for electricity
creates transmission congestion. 155
The cost differences between peak and non-peak demand can be
substantial as the following table illustrates:

152. John C. Hilke, A Consumer Self-Defense Perspective on Electricity
Markets, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 805, 808-09 (2002).
153. Darren Bush & Carrie Mayne, In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why
Bad Regulation Is to Blame for California's Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law
Fails to Protect Us Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage Its
Use), 83 OR. L. REV. 207, 236-38 (2004).
154. Moot, supra note 4, at 315.
155. Id. at 314.
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TYPICAL COSTS OF POWER: COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
USERS, DOLLARS PER MEGAWATT-HOUR ("MWH,,)156

Average
Cost

Generation
Distribution
Total

30-50
20-40
$50-90

Highest
Off-Peak
1,000 to
2,000 Hours

20
10
$30

100-160
40-60
$140-220

b. Regulatory Reform. If regulators decided to employ marginal
cost pricing, there are a number of difficult issues that they will
have to overcome. These include the choice of a pricing method, the
scope of the marginal cost pricing, and methods to protect
consumers who still purchase electricity from monopoly suppliers.
i. Pricing Method. Regulators have two general options to
adopt marginal cost pricing: consumers receive rebates for reducing
electricity usage during periods of peak demand or retail prices are
actually based on the marginal cost of producing electricity.
a. Rebates. Under this approach, consumers are rewarded
for reducing electricity use during periods of high demand. Thus, in
this approach, consumers reduce their electricity loads in response
to actual or forecasted demand. 157 In return, they are entitled to
rebates based on the amount that they reduce their electricity use
during these periods of high demand. For example, a consumer
might receive fifty percent of the amount of money a utility saves
because the consumer reduced its electricity use during a period of
high demand. The utility saves money because it does not have to
generate (or buy) electricity for that customer at a time when the
cost of producing the electricity (or buying it) has increased.
Ai:, compared to marginal cost pricing, this approach creates less
incentive for consumers to reduce their electricity use because
consumers capture only some percentage of the amount of money
that the utility saves because it does not have to pay higher
marginal costs to generate and deliver electricity. If, by comparison,
marginal cost pricing is used, the consumer can save the full amount
of the increase in cost. For example, if the marginal cost of
producing electricity during a period of high demand is 50¢ per
156. This table is from Tobey Winters, Retail Electricity Markets Require
Marginal Cost Real-Time Pricing, ELECTRICITY. J., Nov. 2001, at 74, 76; see also
Moot, supra note 4, at 315 (finding that marginal cost of producing electricity on
a hot summer day can be $501MWh as compared to $201MWh on a cool day).
157. Thomas et aI., supra note 3, at 56.
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kilowatt ("kW") and the consumer is entitled to fifty percent of that
amount, the consumer is entitled to a 25¢ rebate per kW. If,
however, the consumer will have to pay the entire 50¢ per kW for
any electricity used during a peak period, the consumer can save
50¢ for each kW that electricity usage is reduced or deferred to a
period when prices are lower. Marginal cost pricing therefore
provides more incentive for consumer to engage in conservation
efforts. Nevertheless, this plan may be attractive to regulators
because it protects consumers from a run-up in prices during periods
of peak demand while still providing an incentive for consumers to
reduce their electricity usage. 158
b. Variable prices. Regulators can also pursue marginal
cost pricing through use of "time-of-use" or "real-time" pricing. In
time-of-use pricing, meters record when consumption occurs (for
example, hourly), and rates are assigned to time blocks much like
monthly rates are presently assigned. 159 For example, Florida Gulf
Power normally charges customers three different rates (low cost,
medium, and high cost) depending when the electricity is used. 160
Real-time pricing, in contrast, uses an even smarter meter than the
time-of-use meter to communicate the actual price of electricity in
real time. 161
The biggest advantage of time-of-use pricing is that it is easier
for consumers to understand and therefore for utilities and their
regulators to embrace. Nevertheless, the incremental benefits of
real-time pricing over time-of-use pricing may be significant relative
to the small incremental cost of a real time meter over a time-of-use
meter.
Unlike real-time pricing, time-of-use pricing does not
distinguish between hot days and cool days because the rate for
blocks of time is set in advance. In addition, a key issue is how
consumers will react to each type of pricing. Assuming that the
time periods are designed such that the average customer consumes
half of his demand during peak hours at 1O¢ per kilowatt-hour
("kWh") and half during off-peak hours at 4¢ per kWh, consumers
may behave as if they are charged 7¢ per kWh regardless of when
power is consumed. By comparison, real time pricing seems more
likely to cause consumers to engage in conservation efforts since

158. See id.
159. Wolfgang Orasch et aI., Efficient Load-Management Tools in
Competitive Electricity Markets: Time-Of-Use Rates and Real-Time-Pricing,
Presented at the Conference on Domestic Use of Energy, Cape Technikon, Cape
Town (1998), available at http://www.ctech.ac.za/confldue/SOURCElWeb/
OraschlOrasch. htmI.
160. Thomas et aI., supra note 3, at 56.
161. [d.
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they are immediately aware of the costs of not doing so.
Nevertheless, some critics claim real-time pricing will not work
unless consumers have smart devices that shut off appliances when
electricity costs rise or reduce the amount of electricity that they
use. 162 There are, however, a number of studies that indicate
residential and small business consumers are able to shift their
electricity demand in response to prices that vary by time. 163
Moreover, consumer response can be enhanced if utilities and
regulators alert consumers to potential price increases. This would'
be similar to efforts to inform people about the quality of ,air during
periods of potentially unhealthy smog. Most morning newspapers
and television broadcasts convey this information to consumers.
Similarly, the news media can warn consumers about weather
conditions that will result in high demand for electricity and
therefore higher electrical prices. Regulators could require utilities
to maintain websites that indicate current prices, or even send email
alerts, which may make it easier for consumers to keep abreast of
changes in price.
The adoption of real-time pricing would also create a market
demand for devices to assist consumers in reducing their energy
costs. Utilizing a Smart Grid, as discussed earlier/64 real-time
pricing meters can be designed to give consumers immediate
information on the rate of consumption and the current cost per
hour. 16s It will also be possible to automate some consumer
responses. For example, the meter can be connected to "smart"
appliances that shut off or cut back on electricity use when they
receive a signal of higher prices. 166
ii. Consumer Protection. When marginal cost pricing is used in
monopoly electricity markets, regulation of prices will remain
necessary to protect consumer interests. Regulators face three
general challenges.
First, regulators will have to use ratemaking to establish a
revenue requirement for a utility's costs other than the cost of
producing electricity. The retail price would be composed of the
marginal cost of producing and delivering the electricity plus the
price set by regulators to permit the utility to recoup its other costs.
162. See Lisa Kosavanic & Dan Engel, Meeting the Nation's Demand for
Power: A New Take on Demand Programs, ENERGY USER NEWS, May 2004, at
11,12.
163. Borenstein et aI., supra note 5, at 28.
164. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
165. See Chris King & Dan Delurey, Efficiency & Demand Response: Twins,
Siblings, or Cousins?, 54 PuB. UTIL. FORT., March 2005, at 54,56.
166. See Kosavanic & Engel, supra note 162, at 12 (discussing "smart"
appliances).
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Regulators would also need to verifY that the marginal costs a utility
charged were its actual marginal costs. For this purpose, regulators
would need to establish in advance how marginal costs were to be
calculated.
Second, regulators will have to address the problem that
marginal cost pricing creates economic risks for consumers that did
not exist previously because retail rates will vary, sometimes by
substantial amounts. 167 Economic theory would dictate that prices
should be based on marginal costs regardless of volatility, but this
result may not be consistent with a regulator's legal obligation to
design regulation in a manner that protects the public. Moreover,
the adoption of marginal cost pricing may not be politically feasible
if consumers are exposed to price spikes and market volatility.l66 At
the same time, efforts to protect consumers against price spikes will
reduce the extent to which marginal cost pricing creates an
incentive to engage in conservation.
Regulators have a number of options to address this issue.
They can make marginal cost pricing voluntary. Or, as noted
earlier, they can adopt a rebate plan. 169 Under this approach,
consumers are protected against price spikes because they pay
regulated rates for electricity. At the same time, they receive
rebates for reducing the electricity load during peak periods, which
encourages conservation or deferral. Regulators can also adopt a
price ban that limits the amount that prices can be increased or
decreased based on the marginal cost of producing the electricity,
protecting consumers and utility investors. Whichever approach is
adopted, regulators ought to make the ultimate objective to move as
many consumers as politically and legally possible to marginal cost
pricing.
.
Finally, regulators will need to consider the potential burden on
low-income electrical consumers, who will be less able to afford to
install energy saving products, such as better insulation, as
compared to wealthier consumers.
More accurately, these
consumers would not be in a position to pay higher rents for housing
if landlords took additional conservation measures and passed the
costs on to their tenants. This reality suggests that low-income
consumers will end up paying higher electrical bills. However,
because low-income consumers generally live in small housing units,
the amount of the increase may not be very great. Moreover, lowincome consumers can avoid higher prices to the extent that they
167. Phil Hanser et aI., Real-Time Pricing-Restructuring's Big Bang?, PuB.
UTIL. FORT., Mar. 1, 1997, at 22, 28.
168. Kosavanic & Engel, supra note 162, at 12.
169. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text
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conserve electricity during periods of high demand. Nevertheless,
even a small increase in price may be highly detrimental to lowincome consumers. Some low-income consumers may not be able to
reduce electrical use because, for example, they are unable to work
and, therefore, are not in a position to conserve on air conditioning
during the middle of the day, as compared to persons who leave for
work.
There are a number of potential solutions to this problem.
Regulators could exempt low-income consumers from installing
more expensive meters, low-income consumers could be entitled to
purchase electricity at lower rates, or they could receive a discount
when they paid their bills. All of these methods, however, would
require a subsidy from either other ratepayers, which could be part
of the regulated portion of the price that utilities would charge, or
taxpayers in the form of direct subsidies. Since welfare reform
seems unlikely, regulators should attempt to address the issue of
low-income consumers during regulatory reform.

2.
Unregulated Markets
In competitive markets, sellers will continue to sell a product or
service as its marginal revenue exceeds its marginal costs. l7O Thus,
short-run prices in competitive markets reflect marginal costs. l7l In
competitive generation markets for electricity, however, sellers
cannot always charge consumers for electricity according to the time
of day that electricity is produced. As in regulated markets, many
consumers still have meters that measure only the total electricity
172
consumed, but not the time during which it was consumed.
As a result, the market price does not fully reflect the marginal
cost of producing electricity for consumers who lack new meters.
Instead, they purchase electricity at a fixed price for some period of
time, such as one month. A utility will calculate this fixed price
based on an estimate of its average marginal costs for that month.
While this approach is closer to marginal cost pricing than occurs
under traditional cost-of-service ratemaking, it still does not reflect
changes in the cost of producing electricity at different times of day
or on different days within the billing period.
B.

Prices and Conservation
Economic theory predicts that consumer demand will fall as the
price of a product or service goes up. Thus, if consumers pay higher
prices for electricity during periods of higher demand, the demand
170. SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 51, at 49.
171. Id. at 48.
172. See supra notes 52 ,143-48 and accompanying text
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for electricity should fall. This "economic law," however, is subject
to some important caveats. The extent to which consumers will
reduce demand depends on the elasticity of demand. If consumers
do not have a readily available substitute for a product or service,
demand will not fall as rapidly as when less expensive substitutes
are available. 173 Consumers have three potential substitutes for
purchasing electricity: They can reduce demand during peak periods
when prices are higher, invest in products that reduce energy use, or
switch to lower cost sources of energy. According to economic
theory, consumers will choose these options only if they cost less
than paying for more electricity, and the consumer will choose
among these options based on their comparative costs.
While all three of these options will reduce the demand for
electricity, the last may not produce an environmental improvement
if consumers switch to an alternative source of energy that creates
as much or more pollution. 174 For example, some consumers may
switch to a diesel unit that produces pollution emissions that greatly
exceed those produced by the plant whose electricity the consumer is
replacing. 175 Most households, however, are unlikely to keep a
generator in the backyard, and most industrial users will likely rely
on less expensive sources of energy, such as natural gas, to fuel selfgeneration.
Since marginal cost pricing is not widely used, there is only
limited evidence concerning the extent to which consumers will
reduce demand in response to higher prices. The results of
voluntary programs, however, suggest that it will be possible to
obtain significant reductions of demand during periods of peak
usage. A program offered to industrial users by the Georgia Power
Company, for example, has produced as much as a 500 MW
reduction in the utility's load, which represents about ten percent of
the utility's total industrial demand. 176 When the utility charges its
l77
highest prices, it gets an eighteen percent reduction in demand.
Similarly, a voluntary program for industrial users in New York
173. SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 51, at 49.
174. Nichols & Stutz, supra note 145, at 77.
175. Id.
176. Kosavanic & Engel, supra note 162, at 12. The company offers
industrial users a two-part fee composed of standard rates for a baseline level of
consumption and hourly market-based rates for consumption above the baseline
amount. Firms can also receive a credit (at market rates) for reducing
consumption below the baseline amount. Id.
177. John Wilson et aI., USING DEMAND RESPONSIVE LOADS TO MEET
CALIFORNIA'S RELIABILITY NEEDS 8, available at http://www.westgov.org/
wieb/electricJdemand%20response/background%20documents/wilson_paper. pdf
(last visited Apr. 3, 2005).
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took an average of 668 MW in load off the grid during the hottest
summer days, which is the equivalent of the generating capacity of a
178
large turbine power plant.
There have also been positive results concerning residential
consumers. Residential consumers who volunteered for a variable
rate program offered by Gulf Power in Florida consumed only 20% of
the power they purchased during high-cost periods, producing an
179
annual average 14% savings in their electricity bills.
An
experimental plan in California that used marginal cost pricing
including a very high price for critical peak periods resulted in a
180
reduction of over 12% in peak demand. A marginal price plan that
did not include a critical rate produced a 4% decrease in demand
during peak periods. 181 Prices during the peak period were about
three times higher under the plan with the higher prices. 182
These results suggest that at least some industrial and
residential consumers will reduce demand in response to price
increases or rebates. The critical issue is how many consumers are
sensitive to price and how they will act when prices go up (or when
there is an opportunity to earn a rebate). Some commentators
predict that many residential consumers will not react to high prices
by reducing electrical use during peak periods of demand, at least in
the short run. 183 This will happen if the purchase of more energyefficient appliances or of more insulation costs more than paying
higher electricity bills, which may be the situation for persons who
do not consume much electricity, even during periods of peak
demand. Since, however, the benefits of lower demand are benefits
for everyone using electricity, these commentators argue regulators
may be justified in using additional financial incentives to
178. Thomas et aI., supra note 3, at 55.
179. [d. at 58. Under the program, Gulf Power customers pay four different
rates (low, medium, high, and extraordinary) for electricity depending on when
it is used. [d.
180. CHARLES RIVER Assocs., STATEWIDE PRICING PILOT SUMMER 2003 IMPACT
ANALYSIS 7, 9 (2004), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/demandresponse!
documents/group3_final_reportS/2004-10-29_SPP_REPORT.PDF. Under this
plan, demand increased 3% during non-peak hours as consumers shifted their
use from expensive peak power to less expensive off-peak power. [d. The total
demand for peak periods was decreased by 1.4%. [d. at 8 tbl.1-3.
181. [d. at 9-10. Total demand for peak periods under this plan had an
increase of 0.1%. [d. at 10.
182. [d. at 2.
183. Nichols & Stutz, supra note 145, at 77-78; see also Fereidoon Sioshansi
& Ali Vojdani, What Could Possibly Be Better Than Real-Time Pricing? Demand
Response, ELECTRICITY J., June 2001, at 39, 40 (observing that "[m]ost
consumers are totally oblivious to the actual costs they impose on the system as
they use power").
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encourage conservation. This argument anticipates that the cost of
the incentives will be substantially less than the benefits of
protecting the environment and having a more reliable and less
expensive generation and delivery system. l84
Fifteen states
currently have established benefit funds for this purpose funded by
a small charge of all kWh flowing through the transmission and
ls5
distribution grids.

Capital Costs
There are good reasons to believe that marginal cost pricing (or
some variation of it) will lead to conservation efforts by at least some
consumers. Marginal cost pricing will cause consumers to use less
electricity during periods of high demand and, to the extent that
such use cannot be rescheduled to periods of lower cost, to purchase
energy saving products. Nevertheless, for this reform to succeed,
regulators will need to require utilities to install new meters in
millions of homes and small businesses. Although this is by no
means an inexpensive proposition, it does appear to be cost-effective.
There is limited information about the cost of real time meters.
However, the utility in Ontario, Canada is contemplating installing
meters and estimates the cost to be C$150 to C$450 per meter
initially, decreasing to C$150 (about US$120 to US $362).186 As the
number of meters in use increases, the cost of meters should decline
over time. There were 116 million residential customers and an
additional fifteen million commercial customers in the United States
in 2002. 187 Conservatively assuming a cost of $200 per meter for 130
million residential and commercial consumers, the total installation
cost would be about $26 billion. The cost could be lower or higher if
meter costs were more or less than $200 each.ls8
C.

184. At an earlier point in time, utilities funded programs to encourage more
efficient energy use and to assist low-income consumers with home
weatherization, among other expenditures. Steven Nadel, Smart Energy
Policies Through Greater Energy Efficiency, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 226,
227 (2002). The value of energy savings gained by consumers was about double
the cost of producing the savings. [d. at 228.
185. [d.
186. Ontario Ponders Smart v. Not So Smart, THE ELECTRICITY DAILY, Nov.
3,2004.
187. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2002, at 6 tbl.ES (2003),
available at http://tonto.eia.doe.govIFTPROOT/electricity/034802.pdf.
188. The 2,000 meters installed in the California SPP cost an average of
$5,000 to install according to The Utility Reform Network ("TURN"). Marcel
Hawiger & Jeff Nahigian, Letters to the Editor, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 15, 2003,
at 10,10. A high cost-per-meter in a pilot is not indicative, however, of the cost
that will be experienced in a wide-scale rollout. Nevertheless, we are cognizant
of TURN's admonition to consider the impact on the smaller consumers before
HeinOnline -- 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 538 2005

2005]

RETHINKING REFORM

539

The actual total cost, however, would be less since it would be
offset by the amount of money that consumers would save by
decreasing peak purchases in favor of cheaper power during nonpeak periods. While it is difficult to estimate how much money
people will save, rudimentary calculations suggest consumers
should quickly recoup the cost of the new meter. For a ballpark
estimate, assume that the capital markets require a 10% internal
rate of return on the investment in metering over a ten year period.
Annual savings of about $4 billion per year would be necessary to
generate such a return on investment. Since residential consumers
spent over $100 billion on power in 2002,189 a 4% reduction in energy
costs would be sufficient to amortize the investment in metering.
An alternative analysis is to consider the average customer.
According to the study commissioned by the DOE, the average
residential customer in 2002 consumed about 10,880 kWh per year
at an average cost of 8.46¢ per kWh, or a total of $920 for the year .190
The California time-of-day pricing tariff deemed 1,500 hours per
year to be "peak" periods and 7,260 hours per year to be "off-peak"
and assigned prices to the peak periods that were 153% higher than
off-peak prices. 191 If the California parameters are applied to the
DOE data, there is a peak price of 16.960¢ per kWh and off-peak
price of 6.704¢ per kWh. 192 Assuming a meter cost of $200, an
annual savings of about $32.50 would be required to amortize the
cost of the meter.193 To generate $32.50 in savings, about 316 kWh
of consumption (about 3% of the annual consumption of the average
residential consumer) would have to be switched from peak prices to
off-peak prices.
This analysis suggests that large electricity consumers should
be able to recoup the cost of the meters without much difficulty. For
example, the Marriott Hotel in New York saved more than $200,000
in the first summer of experimental testing of Consolidated Edison's
real time pricing by reducing its use of energy during peak periods

installing a meter that will never be paid out. See supra notes 143-48 and
accompanying text.
189. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 187, at 7 tbl.ES.
190. [d. at 6-7 tbl.ES. (demonstrating that retail sales of 1,266,959,000
MWh to 116,448,000 residential customers in 2002, or approximately 10,880
kWh per customer).
191. CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, STATEWIDE PRICING PILOT (SPP): OVERVIEW AND
DESIGN FEATURES 7 (2004), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/demand
response/documentS/2004-09-30_workshop/2004-09-30_SPP_ OVERVIEW. PDF.
192. The weighted average of 16.960¢ per kWh for 1,500 hours and 6.704¢
per kWh for 7,260 hours equals the 8.46¢ per kWh in the EIA data.
193. A $32.50 annual savings for ten years has a present value of $200 using
a 10% discount rate.
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of demand. 194 The experience of residential consumers, however,
indicates that they also will be able to recoup the cost of a new
meter through decreased demand or shifts in the use of electricity.
Customers of Gulf Power in Florida who purchased electricity under
a voluntary variable rate plan saved, on average, 14% on their
annual electricity costS. 195
There are additional savings. Capital costs will be saved as
peak day loads grow less rapidly than total demand due to
consumption switching away from peak periods. It is difficult to
know how much money will be saved by additional conservation by
consumers, but the United States is facing a very large bill for
construction of new generation and transmission facilities in the
next decade. A study commissioned by Edison Electric Institute
estimates that $56 billion of transmission investments will be
required during the current decade. 196 The Energy Information
Agency, an arm of the U.S. DOE, estimates that 88 gigawatts ("gW")
of generation will be required by the year 2010. 197 Using industry
rules of thumb, 88 gW of capacity would require an investment of
between $26 billion198 and $44 billion. 199
Moreover, the potential to save money is substantial because
this household use of electricity in the residential segment is the
largest consumer of power,200 and more importantly, it has the

194. Hanser et aI., supra note 167, at 26.
195. Thomas et al., supra note 3, at 56. For details of the program, see
supra notes 157 , 179 and accompanying text
196. See ERIC HIRST & BRENDAN KIRBY, EDISON ELEc. INST., TRANSMISSION
PLANNING FOR A RESTRUCTURING U.S. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 9 (2001), available
at
http://www.eei.orglindustry_issues/energy_infrastructure/transmission!
transmission_hirst.pdf. But see Steve Huntoon & Alexandra Metzner, The Myth
of the Transmission Deficit, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 1, 2003, at 28, 30 (arguing
that transmission investment needs are overstated and that the actual
investment requirement is $56 billion over the next ten years-$35 billion of
which utilities already plan to spend).
197. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNuAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2004 WITH
PROJECTIONS TO 2025, at 81 (2004), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov
/oiaflarchive/aeo04lpdfl0383(2004).pdf.
198. Based upon a rule of thumb of $300 per kW of capacity. Edward N.
Krapels, What Is a Power Plant Worth?, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 2004, at 31, 31
(misstating the capital cost rule of thumb in terms of "per-megawatt" rather
than kW, but having calculations consistent with $300 per kW).
199. Based upon a rule of thumb of $500 per kW. HIRST & KIRBY, supra note
196, at 10.
200. The EIA breaks down power demand into four segments: residential
(1,267 million megawatt hours ("MM MWh") of consumption in 2002);
commercial (1,116 MM MWh); industrial (972 MM MWh); and other (107 MM
MWh). ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 187, at 4.
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lowest load factor of the three major market segments.
The
residential segment accounts for about 37% of annual electricity
consumption, while the commercial and industrial segments
202
represent 32% and 28%, respectively, of demand.
The amount of
electricity consumed, however, understates the true burden that the
residential segment places on the power grid. Since power cannot be
stored, each utility must have the ability to generate or purchase
enough power to meet peak day demand; therefore, peak usage is a
better indicator of the demand that a segment makes upon the
power grid.
Assuming 40%, 60%, and 80% load factors for
residential, commercial, and industrial consumers, respectively,
residential consumers represent 51% of peak day demand, while
commercial and industrial consumers represent 30% and 19%,
· I y. 203
respect lve
Experimental programs appear to confirm the previous
analysis. A pilot program in Little Rock, Arkansas found that each
new real-time pricing customer helped to avoid the installation of
1.5 kW of electricity, saving $1,200 in capital costS. 204 The net
savings was $350 per customer after paying $850 to install the
necessary metering. 205
Similarly, program participants in a
voluntary New York program, which reduced peak load by an
201. Reliable data on customer load factors are difficult to get, but there
seems to be a consensus among industry analysts that large industrial
consumers have load factors (calculated by dividing average demand by peak
demand) in the range of 80%, commercial consumers have load factors in the
vicinity of 60%, and residential consumers have load factors of 40% or less. See
Robert McCullough & Ruben Brown, Electric Industry Restructuring: The Effect
on Rates Nationwide, FORTNIGHTLY, July 15, 1994, at 20, 21 (conducting an
analysis using load factors of 80%, 60%, and 40%, respectively, for industrial,
commercial, and residential consumers).
202. ENERGY INFo. ADMIN., supra note 187, at 4. In addition to residential,
commercial, and industrial demand, "other" demand (primarily street lighting
and other sales to government entities) represents about 3% of annual demand.
Id. at 4,78.
203. See McCullough & Brown, supra note 201, at 21. Since load factor
equals annual demand divided by peak demand, peak demand is calculated by
dividing annual demand by the load factor (expressed as a decimal). This
analysis simplifies a complex issue, since not every peak load occurs
simultaneously (that is, residential users may use the most power on a hot day,
while a factory may peak as a function of its production scheduling). Therefore,
since peaks are non-coincidental, system peak demand will be less than the sum
of each user's peak demand. The simple analysis demonstrates that residential
consumers account for a higher percentage of peak demand than they do of
average demand.
204. Albert L. Danielsen & Nainish K. Gupta, Seven Myths of Real-Time
Pricing, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 11997, at 23, 23.

205. Id.
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amount equivalent to the generating capacity of a large gas turbine
power plant, received $3.3 million in rebates, which is less than 1%
of how much such a plant would cost.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

The valuable effort to restructure and reform electricity
markets is not addressed to reducing the pollution and other
environmental problems caused by relying on fossil fuels,
particularly coal, to generate electricity. This failure has generated
interest in a new Smart Model of electricity regulation that would
increase reliance on renewable energy sources and would make the
electrical grid more efficient and more reliable.
We believe the Smart Model should also address the demand for
electricity by basing the price of electricity on the marginal cost of
producing it. This is necessary for two reasons. First, the adoption
of smart generation and delivery methods is going slowly, primarily
because these alternatives are more costly than traditional forms of
generation and delivery. Second, one of the reasons for the limited
demand is that consumers are not currently paying for the actual
cost of the electricity that they purchase, particularly during periods
of peak demand.
Marginal cost pricing will lead to greater conservation of energy
and thereby reduce some of the adverse environmental impacts
associated with the production of electricity. Moreover, it will also
reduce the amount of money that the country will have to invest in
additional generation and transmission capacity. While we are
uncertain of the magnitude of these positive effects, we are confident
that consumption side reform should be pursued on the basis of the
information we have and present in this paper.
We would not ignore the opportunity to pursue smart
generation alternatives. The government has a role to play here. It
can do so by fostering technological development and promoting
smart generation methods and a Smart Grid. Governmental efforts
are justified because they address the environmental hazards
associated with traditional electricity generation. Nevertheless, the
widespread adoption of smart generation options will require them
to attract private investment. Until this happens, the government
should require the installation of electricity meters that permit the
use of marginal cost pricing, a reform whose time has come.
There has been some movement in the direction of adopting
marginal cost pricing. It is used in some markets for large
industrial customers,206 and it has been offered to some residential

206. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text
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207
consumers in experimental programs.
At the same time, even the
biggest supporters of marginal cost pricing recognize that there is
little political will in most regulatory jurisdictions to expose
consumers to price spikes and market volatility.208 This dynamic
might change, however, if environmental advocates recognize the
advantages of adopting marginal cost pricing for protecting the
environment. Environmental organizations and citizens might
provide the missing political constituency.
In light of the
opportunity to reduce demand, particularly peak demand, for
electricity, they should take on this cause.
Furthermore, it should be possible to design rate programs that
shield vulnerable consumers from assuming the entire economic
209
risks of price fluctuations.
While such approaches could reduce
the impact of marginal cost pricing in terms of reducing demand,
they would still be desirable as compared to current reliance on
average cost pricing.

207. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text
208. Kosavanic & Engel, supra note 162, at 12.
209. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text
HeinOnline -- 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 543 2005

HeinOnline -- 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 544 2005

